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REGULATING THE ENERGY “FREE RIDERS”
ALEXANDRA B. KLASS

ABSTRACT
This Article explores “free rider” arguments in energy policy. It focuses on
the use of free rider arguments in three types of contemporary public utility
regulatory proceedings—ratepayer-funded energy efficiency programs, utility
compensation for customer-generated rooftop solar energy, and utility
investments in electric vehicle charging infrastructure. It shows how the term
“free rider” is used quite differently in each type of proceeding—as a helpful
metric to determine program cost-effectiveness in the energy efficiency context,
as a pejorative term synonymous with unfair cross subsidies in the rooftop solar
context, and for both purposes in electric vehicle charging infrastructure
proceedings.
This Article claims that in evaluating free rider arguments, regulators and the
public should consider the source and motivations of the parties making these
arguments and, more importantly, both the present benefits and future benefits
of the program in question. This is particularly true for programs designed to
support energy transition. In other words, if the goal of the program is to reduce
barriers to building the infrastructure required to shift to cleaner energy
resources or reduce overall energy demand, program evaluators should
consider future program beneficiaries in addition to current program
beneficiaries. Moreover, regulators should use a range of tools to develop
appropriate metrics to determine cost-effectiveness of programs related both to
distributed solar energy and to electric vehicle charging investments that build
on work done over the past decades in the energy efficiency context. Finally, this
Article suggests that regulators can and should use the precautionary principle
in developing these programs. Use of the precautionary principle is justified due
to the potential for significant harm associated with continued reliance on fossil
fuels in the energy sector and the potential for significant benefits to utility
customers and the public resulting from increased use of distributed solar and
transportation electrification. Additionally, use of the precautionary principle
can help address many of the fairness and cross subsidy concerns raised in these
regulatory proceedings.
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INTRODUCTION
As state regulators, electric utilities, and other interested parties attempt to
develop programs to encourage a range of beneficial consumer behavior with
regard to energy use, critics often are quick to argue that the beneficiaries of
these programs are “free riders.”1 This Article examines the use of free rider
arguments in contemporary energy regulation. In particular, it explores how state
public utility commissions address arguments regarding free riding in three
specific contexts—ratepayer-funded energy efficiency programs, compensation
for nonutility-owned solar energy,2 and electric utility investments in electric
vehicle (“EV”) charging infrastructure.
This Article claims that regulators and the public should exercise caution in
evaluating free rider arguments. In particular, they should always consider which
parties are making free riding arguments; what their motivations might be; the
full range of costs and benefits associated with the policy under consideration;
and the difficulty of quantifying those costs and benefits before reaching a
conclusion that free riding is occurring, that an unreasonable shift of costs
between customer classes is taking place, or that the policy fails to meet a
statutory requirement that it be “just and reasonable.”3
Moreover, regulators and the public should recognize that the term “free
rider” is used in very different ways and for very different purposes in these
1

See, e.g., Charles E. Bayless, Piggybacking on the Grid, PUB. UTIL. FORT., July 2015, at
38, 39-40 (comparing rooftop solar to “Piggyback Air,” a mythical airline that works by
attaching its engineless planes to roofs of competitors’ aircrafts); Prosper Org, Ice Cream for
Fairness!, YOUTUBE (Oct. 21, 2013), https://www.youtube.com/watch?reload=9&v=
zJ8tToIeQ_U (depicting electric utility-funded television advertisement suggesting that utility
net metering programs are akin to a man bringing his own ice cream to an ice cream truck to
take advantage of free toppings provided with ice cream sold at the truck, thus causing the
truck owner to raise prices on ice cream for everyone else); Herman K. Trabish, NV Energy
CEO: Solar Has Gotten a ‘Free Ride’ on the Grid, GREENTECH MEDIA (Aug. 19, 2013),
https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/a-conversation-with-edison-electric-institutechair-michael-yackira (describing current compensation for excess electricity sold by
customers with rooftop solar systems as “free ride” because those electricity sales act as credit
against costs rooftop solar customers pay to support distribution grid infrastructure, even
though those customers still use grid when they buy electricity from the utility “when the sun
goes down”).
2
“Nonutility-owned solar energy” encompasses residential and commercial rooftop solar
energy as well as nonutility-owned community solar gardens where a third party generator
sells the output of the solar garden to the local utility. See, e.g., infra notes 162-69 (discussing
Minnesota’s community solar garden program).
3
Most state statutes governing public utilities require that utility rates and charges be “just
and reasonable” and that state public utility commissions ensure that rates are just and
reasonable through the rate regulation process. See JIM LAZAR, ELECTRICITY REGULATION IN
THE US: A GUIDE ch. 8 (2d ed. 2016) (summarizing “just and reasonable standard” in utility
ratemaking process); Ari Peskoe, Unjust, Unreasonable, and Unduly Discriminatory: Electric
Utility Rates and the Campaign Against Rooftop Solar, 11 TEX. J. OIL GAS & ENERGY L. 211,
228 n.77 (2016) (citing state statutes).
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regulatory proceedings. In the energy efficiency context, free riding is a
longstanding and recognized metric that must be measured in evaluating the
cost-effectiveness of utility-funded energy efficiency programs. 4 In that context,
“free riders” are utility customers that would have invested in the energy
efficiency product or device even in the absence of the utility subsidy. A high
level of free riding results in a finding that the program is not cost-effective and
that money spent on energy efficiency should be spent differently. 5 By contrast,
in rooftop solar proceedings, parties argue that solar panel owners that receive
compensation for the solar energy they produce are “free riding” off the grid,
resulting in an unfair cross subsidy from non-solar owners to solar owners. In
this context, “free riding” is a pejorative term used to label a program as “unfair”
in order to build public, regulatory, and political opposition to the program. 6
Finally, in the EV charging context, some parties in regulatory proceedings are
attempting to develop free riding metrics to create cost-effective programs while
others, particularly oil companies that are threatened by transportation
electrification, are making free riding arguments to oppose such programs as
unfair cross subsidies.7
Even beyond the definitional discrepancies, regulators should be cognizant of
the information asymmetries that permeate utility regulatory proceedings
involving claims of free riding. In many of the proceedings, “hard” data on
program costs and benefits either is not available at all or is within the control
of the electric utility in question. In the face of incomplete information, who
should bear the burden of proving that a program provides system-wide and outof-system benefits and the extent of those benefits? What if present-day benefits
are modest but long-term benefits, like reduced climate change and localized air
pollution impacts, have the potential to be significant? These are important
questions that regulatory commissions are forced to answer in the early stages
of customer-funded utility programs; labels of free riding or cross subsidies can
limit or stall programs with potentially significant future system-wide benefits
if the burden of providing information is misplaced.
The regulatory applications explored in this Article—energy efficiency
programs, utility compensation for customer-generated rooftop solar energy,
and utility investment in EV charging infrastructure—were chosen for specific
reasons. First, each application involves the development of a state policy
governing electric utilities within a regulated monopoly system. 8 This means

4

See infra Section I.A (describing utility-funded energy efficiency programs).
See infra notes 44-45 (discussing recent studies).
6
See infra Section I.B (discussing free riding in context of rooftop solar panels and
demonstrating states’ varied approaches to cost-benefit analysis).
7
See infra Section I.C (summarizing ways in which free riding arguments are used by
different stakeholders to either support or oppose investment in electric vehicle
infrastructure).
8
For a discussion of how states regulate electric and gas utilities as regulated monopolies
through the state public utility ratemaking process, see, for example, LINCOLN L. DAVIES ET
5
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that for each policy, the state public utility commission requires the electric
utility to implement a program that will be paid for by all utility customers (also
known as “ratepayers”) but that may not provide identical benefits to all
customers at the outset. This understandably leads to arguments by the utilities,
various customer classes, and other interested parties that one group of
customers is “free riding” off of the program to the detriment of other groups of
customers or that there is a “cross subsidy”—the idea that one group of
customers (e.g., EV drivers, rooftop solar owners) is being subsidized by another
group of customers, resulting in “unfair” or “unjust and unreasonable” rates. 9
Second, these applications provide helpful case studies because the identities
of the parties making free riding arguments can change dramatically depending
on which parties tend to benefit financially from the program in question. For
instance, in the early stages of energy efficiency programs in the 1980s, utilities
often opposed such programs because they would reduce utility revenues due to
lost electricity sales. However, as state legislatures and public utility
commissions developed programs to “decouple” utility revenues from energy
sales and to otherwise compensate utilities for implementing energy efficiency
programs, utility opposition declined, and free riding concerns became a
function of measuring the cost-effectiveness of particular programs rather than
a reason to oppose energy efficiency programs in general.10
As for rooftop solar, utilities have attempted to impose significant limits on
state “net metering” programs that require utilities to compensate electricity
customers for the energy their solar panels produce at retail electricity rates. 11
Such required purchases cut into utility revenues by reducing the amount of
electric energy that net metering customers purchase from the utility. In
opposing net metering policies, utilities often raise free riding arguments—
namely, that customers with solar panels are paying less than their “fair share”
of the costs to support the electric grid, resulting in unfair cross subsidies
between utility customers with solar panels and utility customers without solar

AL., ENERGY LAW AND POLICY

281-90 (2d ed. 2018) (describing electric utilities as regulated
monopolies and explaining how state and federal laws are designed to prevent utilities from
exercising monopoly power); William Boyd & Ann E. Carlson, Accidents of Federalism:
Ratemaking and Policy Innovation in Public Utility Law, 63 UCLA L. REV. 810, 825-30, 83641 (2016) (discussing public utility commission ratemaking process); Alexandra B. Klass,
Public Utilities and Transportation Electrification, 104 IOWA L. REV. 545, 567-69 (2019)
(discussing basics of electric utility ratemaking). See generally MELISSA WHITED, SYNAPSE
ENERGY ECON., INC., THE RATEMAKING PROCESS (2017), https://www.synapseenergy.com/sites/default/files/Ratemaking-Fundamentals-FactSheet.pdf
[https://perma.cc/J53S-S5R5] (summarizing fundamentals of utility ratemaking and rate
design).
9
See infra Part I (discussing free riding concerns in electric utility laws and ratemaking
procedures).
10
See infra Section I.A (discussing evaluation of free riding in energy-efficiency context).
11
See infra Section I.B (discussing free riding debates in rooftop solar context).
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panels.12 Because solar panel owners pay less for electricity each month but still
use the electric grid when the sun is not shining, utilities argue that the costs of
supporting the grid are unfairly shifted to non-solar customers who are often less
affluent. The extent of this cross subsidy is a matter of significant controversy
in state legislatures and state public utility commissions. 13
With regard to utility investment in EV charging infrastructure, utilities
generally support these policies as they create an investment opportunity to build
new infrastructure for which they can recover not only their costs from all utility
customers but also a rate of return. As a result, in this context it is often the oil
companies, not electric utilities, who stand to lose from program adoption and
have raised free riding arguments in regulatory proceedings. They contend that
requiring all utility customers to pay for utility investments to support
transportation electrification is an unfair cross subsidy between EV owners and
non-EV owners despite a growing body of evidence that greater use of EVs will
ultimately benefit all utility customers through overall reductions in electricity
rates due to more efficient use of electric grid assets.14
Notably, environmental groups generally support all three types of policies,
as they all potentially lead to reduced reliance on fossil fuels to generate
electricity and power transportation. Likewise, some consumer advocacy groups
have been opposed to all three policies because they can lead to higher (or at
least disproportionate) costs on lower-income utility customers in the short term.
These differences in the free riding and cross subsidy arguments in each of
the applications allow for greater insights into the evaluation of free riding
arguments. They also provide a window into the motivations of the regulated
utilities and third parties making the free riding and cross subsidy arguments in
the first place.
Part I first sets forth various definitions of free riding from multiple academic
disciplines as well as regulatory and judicial treatment of free riding arguments
in energy law and policy. It then evaluates more closely the use of free riding
and cross subsidy arguments in the three types of state public utility regulatory
proceedings described above: (1) ratepayer-funded energy efficiency programs,
(2) compensation for customer-generated rooftop solar energy, and (3) utility
investment in EV charging infrastructure. In each case, state public utility
regulators must evaluate free riding arguments and determine how much weight
to give them in setting policies to govern these programs. In each situation, the

12

See, e.g., Hiroko Tabuchi, After Rapid Growth, Rooftop Solar Programs Dim Under
Pressure from Utility Lobbyists, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2017, at A13 (“Utilities argue that net
metering, in place in over 40 states, turns many homeowners into free riders on the grid,
giving them an unfair advantage over customers who do not want or cannot afford solar
panels. The utilities say that means fewer ratepayers cover the huge costs of traditional power
generation.”).
13
See infra Section I.B.
14
See infra Section I.C (summarizing positions of various groups opposed to utility
investment in EV charging infrastructure).
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process is complicated by rapid technological developments; uncertainties
regarding program impacts; concerns associated with future environmental
harms, such as climate change; and a limited ability to assess program
effectiveness today for benefits that may not accrue until years into the future.
Part II claims that regulators should consider both the present costs and
benefits and the future costs and benefits of the program in question as well as
the extent of cross subsidies when evaluating free riding arguments. In other
words, if a goal of the program is to reduce barriers to building infrastructure for
a long-term policy initiative, such as a shift to cleaner energy resources or a
reduction of overall energy demand, program evaluators should consider future
program beneficiaries in addition to current program beneficiaries. This has
already been recognized in the energy efficiency context, where regulators have
concluded that reduced energy demand means that utilities need not invest in
new energy generation plants—including fossil fuel plants—to meet future
customer demand.15 As a result, the debate in the energy efficiency realm has
mostly shifted away from whether utilities should implement energy efficiency
programs at all and instead focuses on developing appropriate evaluation,
measurement, and verification metrics to design programs that are cost-effective
and to incentivize behavior that would not occur in the absence of the program.
This shift has not yet occurred in the context of utility compensation for
rooftop solar or utility investment in EV charging infrastructure.16 In both cases,
opponents of those programs—electric utilities in the case of rooftop solar and
oil companies in the case of EV charging—are relying on free riding and cross
subsidy arguments to oppose the policy in question and alleging unfair cost shifts
with regard to different classes of current customers. Supporters of both types of
programs are marshaling evidence to rebut arguments that an unreasonable cost
shift among customer classes will occur, with mixed success.
In the face of the incomplete information that necessarily exists at the start of
a new program with the potential for significant public benefits, as well as the
serious risks of harms associated with inaction, regulators should utilize the
“precautionary principle” in addressing free riding and cross subsidy concerns.
The precautionary principle calls for a higher level of regulation—or
precaution—when significant but uncertain risks, such as climate change or
harm from toxic chemicals, exist.17
Applying the precautionary principle to new policy development in the areas
of distributed solar energy and utility investment in EV charging reflects the

15

See infra Section I.A.
See infra Sections I.B, I.C.
17
See DOUGLAS A. KYSAR, REGULATING FROM NOWHERE: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND THE
SEARCH FOR OBJECTIVITY 19 (2010) (noting that “precautionary approaches can be defended
as being particularly well suited to safeguarding life and the environment under conditions of
uncertainty and ignorance”); infra Part II (arguing that regulators should consider present
costs of program and future costs of program and apply precautionary principle where
potential harm is serious).
16

588

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 100:581

significant risks associated with continued reliance on fossil fuels in the energy
sector and the potential long-term benefits to utility customers and the public
associated with energy transition. Thus, in these circumstances, it is more
reasonable to use free riding and cross subsidy concerns to place limits on
subsidies for particular investments, such as rebates for residential or
commercial EV charging stations, but to allow investments in longer term grid
improvements that may benefit all utility customers in the long run. Moreover,
this approach allows regulators and electric utilities to build on metrics already
used in the energy efficiency context, including the role of free riders, to develop
appropriate programs in the rooftop solar and EV charging contexts. Finally, use
of the precautionary principle can reduce barriers to important energy transition
programs while addressing many of the fairness and cross subsidy concerns
raised in contemporary utility regulatory proceedings.
I.

FREE RIDING DEBATES IN CONTEMPORARY ENERGY POLICY

The concept of free riding originates in moral philosophy and arguably dates
back to Plato’s Republic.18 In moral philosophy, free riding hinges on the
unfairness of receiving a benefit without paying its associated costs.19 In
defining “fairness,” John Rawls states:
[A] person is [morally] required to do his part as defined by the rules of an
institution when two conditions are met: first, the institution is just (or fair),
that is, it satisfies the two principles of justice; and second, one has
voluntarily accepted the benefits of the arrangement or taken advantage of
the opportunities it offers to further one’s interests.20
In economics, free riding is a broadly defined principle that concerns the
receipt of unpaid-for benefits.21 Concerns over free riding in the economic

18
The Free Rider Problem, STAN. ENCYC. PHIL. (May 21, 2003), https://plato.stanford.edu
/entries/free-rider/ [https://perma.cc/JAU5-3B44] (citing PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 38 (C.D.C.
Reeve trans., Hackett Publ’g Co. 2004) (c. 375 B.C.E.) (“Now no one, it seems, would be so
incorruptible that he would stay on the path of justice, or bring himself to keep away from
other people’s possessions and not touch them, when he could take whatever he wanted from
the marketplace with impunity . . . .”)) (noting Glaucon’s argument to disobey the law when
one cannot be caught); see also Hossein Haeri & M. Sami Khawaja, The Trouble with Free
Riders, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Mar. 2012, at 34, 35 (discussing that origins of free riding date back
to Plato’s Republic; eighteenth century and nineteenth century political philosophers,
including Hume and Mill; and later Paul Samuelson and Mancur Olson in 1950s and 1960s).
19
Garrett Cullity, Moral Free Riding, 24 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3, 7 (1995) (“[A] free rider is
someone whose failure to pay for nonrival goods . . . makes her conduct unfair.”).
20
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 111-12 (1971). Rawls’s two principles of justice
mandate (1) equal access to universal basic liberties and (2) that social and economic
inequalities are arranged to the benefit of the least well-off. Id. at 26.
21
Free Rider, ROUTLEDGE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS (3d ed. 2013) (“An individual who
does not pay for the goods or services he or she consumes.”); see also JAMES R. KEARL,
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context often focus on “public goods.”22 In other words, markets and regulation
should be designed to prevent a party (the “free rider”) from receiving the benefit
of a public good without contributing to its cost.23 Classic public goods include
national defense, street lighting, and environmental protection. 24 Economists
and regulators attempt to design markets and regulations to avoid free riding to
ensure sufficient investment in public goods and avoid overconsumption of
those public goods.
Free riding arguments appear across a broad range of contexts, such as the
auto industry, voting, international trade negotiations, or any area in which
someone contends that unpaid-for benefits have accrued.25 In his classic 1965
work, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups,
Mancur Olson Jr. brought the economic theory of free riding into the public
policy realm with his application of the concept to the social science issue of

PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 441 (1993) (“Free riding occurs when a person benefits from or
uses a valuable good or service without having to pay for it.”).
22
William Nordhaus, Climate Clubs: Overcoming Free-Riding in International Climate
Policy, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 1339, 1339 (2015) (“Free-riding occurs when a party receives
the benefits of a public good without contributing to the costs.”). Definitions of a “public
good” vary, but in general a public good is defined as one that is available to everyone if
anyone has access (jointness in supply), no one can be excluded from its use without excessive
cost (nonexcludability), use by one person does not diminish the amount available for
consumption by others (jointness in consumption), enjoyment by one person of the good does
not diminish the benefits available to others (nonrivalness), no one can avoid using the good
if anyone does (compulsoriness), everyone receives the same amount of the good (equality),
and each user of the good consumes its total output (indivisibility). See Cullity, supra note
19, at 3-4.
23
RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION 20 (1982) (summarizing free rider issues as
“costliness or de facto infeasibility of exclusion from consumption of a collectively provided
good [that] usually eliminates any direct incentive for individual consumers to pay for the
[public] good”); DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE 13 (Phyllis Deane & Mark Perlman
eds., 1979); Cullity, supra note 19, at 3-4; Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public
Expenditure, 36 REV. ECON. & STAT. 387, 389 (1954) (describing free riding problems arising
from collective consumption of goods).
24
Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 73 n.45
(1986).
25
See, e.g., Rodney D. Ludema & Anna Maria Mayda, Do Countries Free Ride on MFN?,
77 J. INT’L ECON. 137, 137-39 (2009) (discussing ability of countries to free ride on other
countries’ negotiation efforts in international trade deals); Ellen Sewell & Charles Bodkin,
The Internet’s Impact on Competition, Free Riding and the Future of Sales Service in Retail
Automobile Markets, 35 E. ECON. J. 96, 97-98 (2009) (discussing ability of online car dealers
to free ride on physical services of brick-and-mortar dealers); Björn Tyrefors Hinnerich, Do
Merging Local Governments Free Ride on Their Counterparts When Facing Boundary
Reform?, 93 J. PUB. ECON. 721, 721-23 (2009) (applying economic free riding analysis to
politics).
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collective action.26 Because individuals are able to derive most, if not all,
benefits of a public good regardless of their individual contributions and because
the comparative value of any individual contribution decreases as group size
increases, it is rational for individuals to free ride off the contributions of other
group members.
Notably, questions of “fairness” often arise in conjunction with free riding
arguments. In the legal academy, what role “fairness” should play in developing
legal policy remains highly contested, as illustrated by Professors Steven
Shavell, Louis Kaplow, and other scholars.27 The merits of this debate are
beyond the scope of this Article but serve as an important backdrop to the
discussion that follows—namely, how advocates in energy regulatory
proceedings use both free riding and fairness arguments interchangeably to
promote their interests.
Free riding arguments are common in the context of energy law and policy
proceedings, where regulators routinely determine who will bear the costs and
benefits of energy investments. This occurs in ratemaking proceedings before
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”), state public utility
commissions, and court proceedings reviewing federal and state regulatory
decisions.28 Advocates often use free riding arguments in a much broader sense
than the classic economics definition focused on public goods. They include
arguments that participants in a utility subsidy program are being paid for actions
or conduct that would have occurred even without the subsidy, thus rendering
26
MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE
THEORY OF GROUPS 14-15 (1965) (summarizing collective-action problem with public goods
that cannot exclude individuals from consumption of the good); see also ELINOR OSTROM,
GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 38-39
(Canto Classics ed. 2015) (1990) (noting that Olson originally introduced collective-action
issue with public goods); Vincent Anesi, Moral Hazard and Free Riding in Collective Action,
32 SOC. CHOICE & WELFARE 197, 197-98 (2009).
27
See, e.g., FAIRNESS IN LAW AND ECONOMICS, at xiii-xvii (Lee Anne Fennell & Richard
H. McAdams eds., 2013) (introducing connections between fairness and economics as
theoretical framework); LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 3-4
(1st Harvard Univ. Press paperback ed. 2006) (arguing that “notions of fairness like corrective
justice should receive no independent weight in the assessment of legal rules” and that a
“welfare-based normative approach” should be used exclusively instead); Troy A. Rule, Solar
Energy, Utilities, and Fairness, 6 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 115, 127-28 (20142015) (relying on Kaplow and Shavell to argue that claims of “fairness” to oppose
compensation for rooftop solar energy should be viewed with skepticism and discussing role
of fairness in legal policy more broadly).
28
See, e.g., DAVIES ET AL., supra note 8, at 259-374 (discussing federal and state
ratemaking processes and judicial review of same); R EGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT,
REVENUE REGULATION AND DECOUPLING: A GUIDE TO THEORY AND APPLICATION 3-8 (2016),
https://www.raponline.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/rap-revenue-regulation-decouplingguide-second-printing-2016-november.pdf [https://perma.cc/R3NN-YARM] (describing
traditional rate regulation); WHITED, supra note 8, at 1 (summarizing fundamentals of utility
ratemaking and rate design).
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the program inefficient or “unjust and unreasonable” under governing law. They
also include arguments over cross subsidies—that a group of industry actors or
customer classes are obtaining excess benefits from costs shared by all industry
actors or customer classes and, correspondingly, that some industry actors or
customer classes are overpaying or underpaying for the benefits they receive.
For instance, in the context of FERC proceedings, parties—often investorowned electric utilities—argue for or against a change in FERC policy on the
grounds that it permits or encourages free riding. As an example, in 2011, in
FERC Order No. 1000 (“Order 1000”),29 FERC imposed new regional
transmission line planning requirements and cost allocation rules on utilities. 30
In response, some utilities argued that other utilities and their customers were
free riding by not paying a proportional amount of the costs associated with new
electric transmission lines covered by the Order and that the new lines would
benefit some utility customers more than others.31 Those utilities argued that
FERC must follow the “cost-causation principle,” a requirement derived from
the Federal Power Act’s mandate that rates be “just and reasonable.”32 They
contended that the cost-causation principle requires that FERC can only approve
rates that charge consumers roughly proportionally to the benefits they receive. 33
As one federal court put it, the “cost causation principle targets something
called the ‘free rider problem,’ which FERC acknowledged that it sought to
‘address through its cost allocation reforms’” in Order 1000.34 Although the
29

Order on Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning and
Operating Public Utilities, 136 FERC ¶ 61,051 (July 21, 2011) (final rule) (codified at 18
C.F.R. pt. 35) [hereinafter FERC Order No. 1000].
30
See Order on Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning and
Operating Public Utilities, 139 FERC ¶ 61,132, paras. 576, 578 (May 17, 2012) (order on
rehearing and clarification) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) [hereinafter FERC Order No. 1000A] (affirming basic determinations in Order 1000 and defining “free riders” as “entities who
are being subsidized by those who pay the costs of the benefits that free riders receive for
nothing” and who, in the electric transmission line context, “do not bear cost responsibility
for benefits that they receive in their use of the transmission grid”); see also El Paso Elec. Co.
v. FERC, 832 F.3d 495, 499 (5th Cir. 2016) (providing background on FERC’s
implementation of new rules); Herman K. Trabish, Has FERC’s Landmark Transmission
Planning Effort Made Transmission Building Harder?, UTIL. DIVE (July 17, 2018),
https://www.utilitydive.com/news/has-fercs-landmark-transmission-planning-effort-madetransmission-building/527807/ [https://perma.cc/8WDC-UG7Z].
31
See FERC Order No. 1000-A, supra note 30, at para. 198.
32
Id. at para. 199.
33
See Ill. Commerce Comm’n v. FERC, 576 F.3d 470, 476 (7th Cir. 2009) (“FERC is not
authorized to approve a pricing scheme that requires a group of utilities to pay for facilities
from which its members derive no benefits, or benefits that are trivial in relation to the costs
sought to be shifted to its members. ‘[A]ll approved rates [must] reflect to some degree the
costs actually caused by the customer who must pay them.’” (alterations in original) (quoting
KN Energy, Inc. v. FERC, 968 F.2d 1295, 1300 (D.C. Cir. 1992))).
34
El Paso Elec. Co., 832 F.3d at 500 (quoting FERC Order No. 1000-A, supra note 30, at
para. 562).
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facial challenges to Order 1000 were not successful, both the Order itself—in
which FERC referenced free riding issues—as well as the court decisions
evaluating Order 1000 recognized the potential for free riding in federal
transmission planning and cost allocation.35
Utilities have also raised free riding arguments in the context of who should
pay for upgrades to existing transmission lines.36 There, utilities have argued
that individuals might be forced to subsidize the upgrades of others by paying
the cost while others derive the benefits.37 Free riding arguments can also arise
in transmission rate cases for individual utilities.38 Utilities have argued that
transmission customers (i.e., other power providers contracting for transmission
services) can free ride by misrepresenting their actual energy demand because
charges are calculated on an annual basis, using a snapshot of demand at a single
point in time.39 Utilities worry that transmission customers can intentionally
lower demand for that short time to derive unjust benefits for the whole year. 40
At the state level, public utility commissions and public service commissions
frequently address free riding arguments when commissions set rates for
electric, gas, and telecommunications utilities. For example, in the early 2000s,
telecommunications companies in Illinois and Michigan argued that their
competitors were free riding on their phone infrastructure when the competitors
used that infrastructure to offer local call pricing for long distance calls. 41 For
electric and gas utilities, most state statutes direct utility commissions to ensure
that utility rates, charges, and programs are “just and reasonable.”42 Thus, free
riding claims associated with one class of ratepayers cross subsidizing another
class of ratepayers are arguments that a particular rate, program, or charge is
unjust and unreasonable or, in a broader sense, “unfair.”43

35

See, e.g., S.C. Pub. Serv. Auth. v. FERC, 762 F.3d 41, 92 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (upholding
challenges to FERC Order No. 1000, supra note 29).
36
See, e.g., Sw. Power Pool, Inc., Order on Tariff Filing, 163 FERC ¶ 61,092, para. 21
(May 4, 2018) (“[T]he second generator could essentially free ride on the investment of the
first generator as a transmission customer taking point-to-point transmission service.”).
37
See id. at para. 22.
38
See, e.g., PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., Order Rejecting Filing, 162 FERC ¶ 61,136,
para. 1 (Feb. 16, 2018) (describing utility company’s proposal to “reduce a transmission
customer’s incentive to avoid consumption during the system peak, and thereby shift
transmission costs to other transmission customers”).
39
Id. at para. 2.
40
Id.
41
Focal Commc’ns Corp., No. 00-0027, at *11-12 (Ill. Commerce Comm’n May 8, 2001)
(arbitration decision), 2001 WL 902639; Coast to Coast Telecomms., Inc., Case No. U-12382,
at *3 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm’n Aug. 17, 2000) (order adopting arbitrated agreement), 2000
WL 1409759.
42
See supra note 3 and accompanying text (discussing state statutes).
43
See, e.g., Peskoe, supra note 3, at 228 (discussing state court decisions reviewing public
utility commission rate-design issues surrounding cost shifts between customer classes and
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When it comes to utility-funded energy efficiency programs, the question is
often whether utilities or government actors are subsidizing conduct—such as
residential or commercial customer energy efficiency investments (e.g.,
weatherproofing, energy-efficient light bulbs, energy-efficient boilers)—that
would have been undertaken even absent the subsidy. 44 If conduct that would
have otherwise occurred is being subsidized, the program causes an
unreasonable cost shift among different customer classes. This cost shift is
unreasonable because all utility customers pay the utility for administering the
program (at a rate determined by the state utility commission), and those
customers who would have invested in energy efficiency even absent the
program are receiving a subsidy paid for by others. Thus, those investments
shouldn’t “count” as program benefits because they would have occurred
anyway. Because of these concerns—which most energy efficiency experts
characterize as free riding—government regulators, utilities, and industry
experts have created a range of metrics and have conducted empirical studies to
evaluate the cost-effectiveness of these programs and determine the level of free
riding.45
concluding that most courts defer to commissions so long as such allocation in rate design is
reasonable).
44
See, e.g., Marie-Laure Nauleau, Free-Riding on Tax Credits for Home Insulation in
France: An Econometric Assessment Using Panel Data, 46 ENERGY ECON. 78, 79 (2014)
(“[F]ree-ridership, which is defined as behavior occurring ‘when the agents targeted by the
policy take the incentives but would have made the investment anyway.’” (footnote omitted)
(quoting Anna Alberini, Andrea Bigano & Marco Boeri, Looking for Free Riding: Energy
Efficiency Incentives and Italian Homeowners, 7 ENERGY EFFICIENCY 571, 572 (2014)));
Nicholas Rivers & Leslie Shiell, Free Riding on Energy Efficiency Subsidies: The Case of
Natural Gas Furnaces in Canada, 37 ENERGY J. 239, 239 (2016) (“We assess the extent to
which subsidies for home energy efficiency improvements in Canada have been paid to
households that would have undertaken the improvements anyway—the so-called free rider
rate.”); Kenneth E. Train, Estimation of Net Savings from Energy-Conservation Programs,
19 ENERGY 423, 424 (1994) (“The customers who implemented measures under a program
even though they would have installed the measures without the program (for example,
customers who received rebates for measures that they would have installed anyway) are
called ‘free riders.’”).
45
See Matthew Collins & John Curtis, Willingness-to-Pay and Free-Riding in a National
Energy Efficiency Retrofit Grant Scheme, 118 ENERGY POL’Y 211, 215 (2018) (defining level
of free riding by “compar[ing] the total cost of the completed retrofit, the cost to the household
of the retrofit following the award of grant aid, and the total willingness-to-pay of each
household for that retrofit”); Peter Grösche & Colin Vance, Willingness to Pay for Energy
Conservation and Free-Ridership on Subsidization: Evidence from Germany, 30 ENERGY J.
135, 137-38 (2009) (describing methodology of study using empirical data from German
single-family home owners); Nauleau, supra note 44, at 79 (assessing effectiveness of French
income tax credit on investment decisions for household retrofits); Rivers & Shiell, supra
note 44, at 239 (assessing effectiveness of forced-air natural gas furnace subsidy and Canadian
tax credit on free-rider rate); infra Section I.A (describing various energy efficiency
programs).
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In other energy-related contexts, such as utility compensation for customergenerated rooftop solar and utility investments in EV charging infrastructure,
free riding is described quite differently. In these cases, rather than labeling as
“free riding” behavior that would have occurred even in the absence of a
program subsidy, the claim centers more directly on a certain class of utility
customers paying “less than their fair share” for a benefit provided by the
utility.46 For instance, rooftop solar owners are often labeled as free riders.47 This
is because customers with solar panels have lower utility bills than customers
without solar panels because customers with solar panels receive bill credits for
the solar energy they generate, but they still receive the full benefit of the electric
grid when the sun is not shining.48 Likewise, in the context of utility-funded EV
charging programs, if all utility customers pay for the utility to install EV
charging stations within the utility’s service territory but only some customers
own EVs and utilize the charging stations, opponents of such programs contend
that non-EV owners are subsidizing EV owners and that EV owners are free
riders.49 Just like in the rooftop solar context, opponents of EV charging
programs allege that such cost shifts between customer classes are “unjust and
unreasonable” under state utility ratemaking statutes and constitute free riding.50
Of course, free riding claims are neutralized if in all three instances the public
benefits to all utility customers associated with the energy efficiency upgrades,
rooftop solar energy generation, or use of EVs are above some determined
threshold. The difficulty, though, is determining the nature and amount of the
benefits these programs provide on both a near-term basis and a long-term basis.
How interested parties, experts, and state utility commissions evaluate these
issues is the topic of the remainder of this Part.
A.

Energy Efficiency Programs

Energy efficiency is a means of reducing energy consumption while still
attaining the same output.51 Energy efficiency is divided into three broad

46

See Tabuchi, supra note 12, at A13.
See id.
48
See id. (discussing utility claims of free riding in rooftop solar context).
49
See American Petroleum Institute-Illinois Petroleum Council, Comment Letter on
Notice of Inquiry Regarding Electric Vehicles, No. 18-NOI-01, at 2 (Ill. Commerce Comm’n
Oct. 22, 2018), https://www.icc.illinois.gov/Electricity/workshops/evnoi.aspx [https://
perma.cc/4947-M7XD] (“The EV charging infrastructure is currently only used by a small
fraction of drivers, many of whom are wealthy enough to afford these more expensive
vehicles.”).
50
See id.
51
NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., NAT’L ACAD. OF ENG’G & NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, REAL
PROSPECTS FOR ENERGY EFFICIENCY IN THE UNITED STATES 21 n.1 (2010) (noting that
although “‘energy efficiency’ and ‘energy conservation’ are often used
interchangeably, . . . they refer to different concepts. Improving energy efficiency involves
accomplishing an objective, such as heating a room to a certain temperature, while using less
47
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categories: (1) buildings (reducing electricity and space heating needs through
new appliances, technologies, increased insulation, and the like),
(2) transportation (increasing the efficiency of vehicles and vehicle fuels), and
(3) industrial energy use.52 In the United States, energy use has become
significantly more efficient over the past few decades, allowing energy
consumption to remain flat even in the face of economic growth. 53 Programs to
improve energy efficiency include vehicle fuel economy standards and
appliance efficiency standards at the federal level, as well as a range of local and
state policies to promote energy efficiency in buildings and appliances through
mandates and tax incentives.54
Energy efficiency in residential and commercial buildings is particularly
significant as it represents a low-cost opportunity to reduce U.S. energy usage
as well as the associated greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions. In 2018, the
electric power sector consumed 38% of total U.S. energy, the residential and
commercial sectors consumed 11%, the transportation sector consumed 28%,
and the industrial sector consumed 23%.55 With regard to GHG emissions, in
2017, the transportation sector and electric power sector both represented 29%
of U.S. emissions, with the commercial/residential sector representing 12%,
industry 22%, and agriculture 9%.56 Notably, in 2018, residential and
commercial buildings, which require energy for electricity and for space heating,
consumed approximately 40% of U.S. energy and represented approximately the

energy. Energy conservation involves behavior expressed in actions taken to reduce energy
use and can involve lifestyle changes—e.g., lowering the thermostat in the winter”).
52
DAVIES ET AL., supra note 8, at 137.
53
Id.
54
Id. (describing various federal and state programs aimed at promoting energy
efficiency).
55
U.S. Energy Facts Explained, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov
/energyexplained/us-energy-facts/ [https://perma.cc/RLN2-ZKAS] (last updated Aug. 28,
2019) (summarizing energy use sectors by energy source and primary energy consumption
data).
56
Sources of Greenhouse Gas Emissions: Overview, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY,
https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/sources-greenhouse-gas-emissions
[https://perma.cc
/W7HS-UDJE] (last visited Feb. 18, 2020) (summarizing total U.S. greenhouse gas emissions
by economic sector).
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same percentage of U.S. CO2 emissions.57 “In large urban centers such as
Chicago and New York,” buildings constitute over 70% of energy use. 58
Thus to the extent the United States can reduce energy use in residential and
commercial buildings through energy efficiency, there will be significant cost
savings and environmental benefits.59 Indeed, experts show that, when treated
as an energy resource (i.e., as an equivalent to generating power), energy
efficiency is the third largest U.S. energy resource (behind coal and natural gas
and in front of nuclear energy) and is also the lowest cost resource.60 As a result
of these potential savings and other benefits, there has been a significant
emphasis on policymaking at the state level to support energy efficiency
programs in general and utility-funded energy efficiency programs in particular.

57

Frequently Asked Questions: How Much Energy Is Consumed in U.S. Residential and
Commercial Buildings?, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs
/faq.php?id=86&t=1 [https://perma.cc/3BWD-L55K] (last updated May 14, 2019); Overview,
ALLIANCE TO SAVE ENERGY, https://www.ase.org/initiatives/buildings [https://perma.cc
/4MMX-EKUN] (last visited Feb. 18, 2020) (“Buildings – including offices, homes, and
stores – use 40% of our energy and 70% of our electricity. Buildings also emit over one-third
of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions, which is more than any other sector of the economy.”); see
also Benefits of Green Building, Press Room, U.S. GREEN BUILDING COUNCIL,
https://www.usgbc.org/articles/green-building-facts [https://perma.cc/H3CF-WYNA] (last
visited Feb. 18, 2020) (“Buildings account for almost 40 percent of global energy-related
CO2 . . . .”).
58
Iain Campbell & Koben Calhoun, Old Buildings Are U.S. Cities’ Biggest Sustainability
Challenge, HARV. BUS. REV. (Jan. 21, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/01/old-buildings-are-u-scities-biggest-sustainability-challenge.
59
See, e.g., Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth J. Wilson, Remaking Energy: The Critical
Role of Energy Consumption Data, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 1095, 1098-99 (2016) (“[I]nvesting
$520 billion in nontransportation energy efficiency by 2020 could generate energy savings
worth $1.2 trillion, reduce end-use energy demand by 23 percent compared to current
projections, and eliminate over 1.1 gigatons of greenhouse gas emissions annually.” (citing
MCKINSEY & CO., UNLOCKING ENERGY EFFICIENCY IN THE U.S. ECONOMY 1 (2009),
https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/mckinsey/dotcom/client_service/epng/pdfs/unlocking%
20energy%20efficiency/us_energy_efficiency_exc_summary.ashx [https://perma.cc/T48P3GTM])).
60
AM. COUNCIL FOR AN ENERGY-EFFICIENCT ECON., THE GREATEST ENERGY STORY YOU
HAVEN’T HEARD: HOW INVESTING IN ENERGY EFFICIENCY CHANGED THE US POWER SECTOR
AND GAVE US A TOOL TO TACKLE CLIMATE CHANGE 5-6 (2016), https://aceee.org/sites/default
/files/publications/researchreports/u1604.pdf [https://perma.cc/6QRX-HW4S]; Annie Gilleo,
New Data, Same Results—Saving Energy Is Still Cheaper than Making Energy, ACEEE:
ACEEE BLOG (Dec. 1, 2017, 11:29 AM), https://aceee.org/blog/2017/12/new-data-sameresults-saving-energy [https://perma.cc/R7VL-Q3ML] (showing cost comparisons of energy
efficiency with other energy resources).
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Utility-Funded Energy Efficiency Programs

Since the 1980s, utilities have offered energy efficiency programs to
customers—either voluntarily or as a result of state mandates.61 Today, such
programs exist in one form or another in all fifty states and the District of
Columbia and include “financial incentives, such as rebates and loans; technical
services, such as audits, retrofits, and training for architects, engineers, and
building owners; behavioral strategies; and educational campaigns about the
benefits of energy efficiency improvements.”62 States spent approximately $8
billion on energy efficiency programs in the utility sector in 2018, paid for by
utility customers through their monthly electric and gas bills. 63 According to the
American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy (“ACEEE”), these
programs resulted in over 27 million megawatt hours of electricity saved in
2018.64 Benefits associated with these energy savings included reduced GHG
emissions, reduced energy costs, utility system benefits, and risk management
through diversifying utility resource portfolios.65
As Professors Michael Vandenbergh and Jim Rossi have noted, the utility is
a critical player in efforts to reduce electricity demand through energy efficiency
measures:
[T]he distribution utility serves as an intermediary and gatekeeper between
the consumer and the electric grid. A utility that has incentives to reduce
household or other demand for electricity can play its information, service,
61

WESTON BERG ET AL., AM. COUNCIL FOR AN ENERGY-EFFICIENT ECON., THE 2019 STATE
ENERGY EFFICIENCY SCORECARD 22 (2019) [hereinafter BERG ET AL., ACEEE ENERGY
EFFICIENCY SCORECARD], https://aceee.org/sites/default/files/publications/researchreports
/u1908.pdf [https://perma.cc/DL3E-5K8J].
62
Id. at 17; see also JOSEPH ETO, THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF U.S. UTILITY
DEMAND-SIDE MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS 2 (1996), https://emp.lbl.gov/sites/all/files
/39931.pdf [https://perma.cc/V36V-E2HE] (detailing different types of utility-funded energy
efficiency programs, such as “(1) general information to increase customer awareness of
energy use and of opportunities to save energy; (2) technical information, including energy
audits, which identify specific recommendations for improvements in energy use;
(3) financial assistance in the form of loans or direct payments to lower the first cost of
energy-efficient technologies; (4) direct or free installation of energy-efficient technologies;
(5) performance contracting, in which a third party contracts with both the utility and a
customer and guarantees energy performance”).
63
BERG ET AL., ACEEE ENERGY EFFICIENCY SCORECARD, supra note 61, at 1; see also
STEVEN R. SCHILLER & TOM ECKMAN, SEE ACTION, SEE ACTION GUIDE FOR STATES:
EVALUATION, MEASUREMENT, AND VERIFICATION FRAMEWORKS—GUIDANCE FOR ENERGY
EFFICIENCY PORTFOLIOS FUNDED BY UTILITY CUSTOMERS 10 (2018) [hereinafter SEE ACTION
GUIDE FOR STATES], https://www4.eere.energy.gov/seeaction/system/files/documents/EMVFramework_Jan2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/3KV6-PFCY].
64
BERG ET AL., ACEEE ENERGY EFFICIENCY SCORECARD, supra note 61, at 1.
65
State Energy Efficiency Benefits and Opportunities, ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY,
https://www.epa.gov/statelocalenergy/state-energy-efficiency-benefits-and-opportunities
[https://perma.cc/V9JR-8UYS] (last visited Feb. 18, 2020).
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and access roles in ways that will induce widespread uptake of efficiency
and conservation measures. A utility that does not can discourage
widespread uptake of these measures and can do so in a variety of
nontransparent ways, whether by increasing consumers’ transaction costs
(e.g., by requiring numerous or slow approvals for household solar
photovoltaic installation, by understaffing key positions necessary for
promotion of efficiency and conservation programs, and by imposing
stringent requirements on grid access), or by limiting the extent or efficacy
of information provided to consumers (e.g., by not making prompt, inhome energy use feedback easily available).66
For decades, policymakers have attempted to design programs to align the
interests of electric utilities with the goals of energy efficiency. 67 Because utility
revenues were historically tied to volumetric sales of electricity, energy
efficiency programs resulted in reduced utility revenues. 68 Not surprisingly then,
in the early days of energy efficiency programs, utilities opposed such programs
on the grounds that they led to free riding and unfair cross subsidies among
customer classes.69 State legislatures and public utility commissions have put in
place a variety of mechanisms to minimize or eliminate the adverse financial
impact on utilities from energy efficiency programs. The most common
mechanisms are: (1) allowing the utility to recover from ratepayers the direct
costs of energy efficiency programs; (2) lost margin recovery or “decoupling”
programs that ensure that “[a]ctual utility earnings are . . . brought in line with
earnings authorized by the governing body, removing – or at least
mitigating – the utility’s disincentive to invest in energy efficiency programs
66
Michael P. Vandenbergh & Jim Rossi, Good for You, Bad for Us: The Financial
Disincentive for Net Demand Reduction, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1527, 1544-45 (2012).
67
See, e.g., Peskoe, supra note 3, at 265-66.
68
Incentivizing Utility-Led Energy Efficiency Programs, ACEEE, https://aceee.org/sector
/state-policy/toolkit/utility-programs [https://perma.cc/VPZ3-39QF] (last visited Feb. 18,
2020) (“[I]t is widely recognized that spending on energy efficiency programs has a
detrimental effect on utility revenues, by reducing sales of the utility’s core product, electricity
or gas. The reasoning is straightforward: while a utility’s variable costs change in proportion
to sales volume, fixed costs associated with distribution and customer service do not. . . . This
net lost revenue affects the utility’s balance sheet, reducing the return to its investors and
providing a strong incentive for utilities not to invest in programs that help their customers
use energy more efficiently.”); see also Will Nissen & Samantha Williams, The Link Between
Decoupling and Success in Utility-Led Energy Efficiency, ELECTRICITY J., Mar. 2016, at 59,
62 (discussing benefits of decoupling and noting that as of January 2016, fifteen states had
implemented electricity decoupling with proposals pending in eight additional states);
Vandenbergh & Rossi, supra note 66, at 1546.
69
See, e.g., Peskoe, supra note 3, at 290 (“In the 1970s and 1980s, it was the [utilities] that
raised concerns about intra-class subsidization. The ‘paradox of conservation’ was that
ratepayer-subsidized programs to reduce consumption—in contrast to earlier subsidies
designed to increase [utility] sales—could harm non-participating consumers by raising
overall rates.”).
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due to reduced sales”; and (3) performance incentives that allow the utility to
earn a return on investments in energy efficiency, similar to the return on
investment it earns for building a power plant or transmission infrastructure. 70
In general, these programs have succeeded in reducing utility opposition to
energy efficiency programs, leaving arguments about free riding, evaluation of
program performance metrics, and the like to economists and other experts. 71
That does not mean free riding arguments are absent from energy efficiency
policy debates. On the contrary, they are front and center. The difference,
however, is that the utility is not generally making the free riding argument. 72
2.

Free Riding as a Metric for Determining Cost-Effectiveness of Energy
Efficiency Programs

According to the U.S. Department of Energy, “[f]ree-ridership issues are by
no means peculiar to energy efficiency; they arise in many policy areas,
whenever economic agents are paid an incentive to do what they might have
done anyway.”73 The reason free ridership is important in this context is to

70
Lost Margin Recovery, ACEEE, https://aceee.org/sector/state-policy/toolkit/utilityprograms/lost-margin-recovery [https://perma.cc/ZH6J-BCDF] (last visited Feb. 18, 2020)
(describing decoupling programs); see also Incentivizing Utility-Led Energy Efficiency
Programs, supra note 68 (describing mechanisms of revenue recovery including program cost
recovery, lost margin recovery, and performance incentives).
71
See infra notes 84-86 and accompanying text (discussing scholarly proposals and
literature examining data concerning energy efficiency programs); see also ETO, supra note
62, at 10; MARTIN KUSHLER, DAN YORK & PATTI WITTE, AM. COUNCIL FOR AN ENERGYEFFICIENT ECON., ALIGNING UTILITY INTERESTS WITH ENERGY EFFICIENCY OBJECTIVES: A
REVIEW OF RECENT EFFORTS AT DECOUPLING AND PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES 16-17 (2006),
https://aceee.org/sites/default/files/publications/researchreports/u061.pdf [https://perma.cc
/M8B4-ZM2H] (concluding that state regulatory approaches to overcoming utility
disincentives to promote energy efficiency such as decoupling and performance incentives
are effective in states in which they are used).
72
This is not to say that utilities have become strong supporters of energy efficiency
programs. Indeed, as Professors Vandenbergh and Rossi have stated:
[S]o long as volumetric pricing and guaranteed cost recovery through regulated rates
leads utilities to view efficiency and conservation as revenue erosion, they will have
incentives to create an appearance of demand reduction (e.g., to maintain reputation,
satisfy regulators’ demands, etc.), but under the existing approach neither utilities nor
customers can be expected to be firmly committed to reducing the aggregate usage of
electricity.
Vandenbergh & Rossi, supra note 66, at 1548; see also Peskoe, supra note 3, at 153 (detailing
arguments of Edison Electric Institute, the trade association for investor-owned utilities, that
decoupling efforts remain insufficient to address “transformative threats” to utility-industry
model and that energy efficiency programs continue to act as “cross subsidies” between those
customers who directly benefit from energy efficiency programs and those who do not).
73
STEVEN R. SCHILLER, SEE ACTION, ENERGY EFFICIENCY PROGRAM IMPACT EVALUATION
GUIDE
5-8
(2012)
[hereinafter
SEE
ACTION
IMPACT
EVALUATION],

600

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 100:581

ensure that the utility makes “prudent use of energy efficiency dollars.” 74 In
other words:
If program dollars are spent on people who would have taken the actions
anyway, without program support, then those people are free riders, and
those dollars were perhaps misspent. Evaluators are tasked with studying
how much of a program’s resources were spent on free riders, and what the
program savings were, net of free riders.75
Or, as stated by one energy expert:
One of the most vexing problems surrounding the issues of free-ridership
is definitional. To the economic purist, the textbook definition of freeridership is a person who consumes a good without paying for it. For a
variety of reasons, the working definition of free-ridership as it pertains to
public benefits and utility energy-efficiency programs is significantly
different. In this case a free-rider is someone who would install an energyefficiency measure without any program incentives because of the return
on investment of the measure, but receives a financial incentive or rebate
anyway. This definition has been adopted by utilities, program directors,
and regulatory bodies that are currently discussing energy-efficiency
programs.76
Energy efficiency experts have developed specific tests to evaluate the costeffectiveness of utility-funded energy efficiency programs. The most common
ones are: (1) Total Resource Cost Test (“TRC”), which compares benefits to the
utility (“avoided supply-side-cost benefits, additional resource savings
benefits”) with costs to participants of installing the measures plus the cost of
program administration; (2) Societal Cost Test (“SCT”), which is similar to the
TRC except that it “explicitly quantifies externality benefits such as avoided
pollutant emissions not represented in market prices and other non-energy
https://www4.eere.energy.gov/seeaction/system/files/documents/emv_ee_program_impact_
guide_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/4PJ9-M9EX].
74
Id.
75
Id.; see also STEPHEN R. SCHILLER, NAT’L ACTION PLAN FOR ENERGY EFFICIENCY,
MODEL ENERGY EFFICIENCY PROGRAM IMPACT EVALUATION GUIDE 5-1 to -3 (2007)
[hereinafter NAT’L ACTION PLAN IMPACT EVALUATION GUIDE], https://www.epa.gov/sites
/production/files/2015-08/documents/evaluation_guide.pdf [https://perma.cc/FX9K-JP56]
(defining free ridership, spillover effects, and other factors to consider in differentiating gross
savings and net savings from energy efficiency programs); Carl Blumstein, Program
Evaluation and Incentives for Administrators of Energy-Efficiency Programs: Can
Evaluation Solve the Principal/Agent Problem?, 38 ENERGY POL’Y 6232, 6234 (2010) (“It is
not desirable to reward IOUs for the energy savings of free riders for two reasons: (1) the
payments are unearned and (2) payments for free-rider savings would bias IOU programs in
favor of programs in which consumers already had a strong predilection to participate.”).
76
Stephen Heins, Energy Efficiency and the Spectre of Free-Ridership, ECEEE,
https://www.eceee.org/library/conference_proceedings/ACEEE_buildings/2006/Panel_12/p
12_8/ [https://perma.cc/VPL4-5HMU] (last visited Feb. 18, 2020).
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benefits (e.g., improved health/productivity)”; (3) Program Administrator Cost
Test (“PACT”), also known as the Utility Cost Test (“UCT”), which compares
the utility’s avoided-cost benefits with program expenditures (both the
incentives and the administrative costs); (4) Participant Cost Test (“PCT”),
which compares “participant benefits (incentives plus bill savings) with
participant costs (incremental or capital cost, installation O&M, etc.)”; and
(5) Ratepayer Impact Measure (“RIM”), which “compares the utility’s avoided
cost benefits with the cost of administering energy efficiency programs plus lost
revenue from reductions in customer energy consumption.”77
According to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”), “[t]here is
no single best test for evaluating the cost-effectiveness of energy efficiency.” 78
Many states use multiple tests to evaluate cost-effectiveness of energy efficiency
programs for a more comprehensive approach as each test “provides different
information about the impacts of energy efficiency programs from distinct
vantage points in the energy system.”79 The National Action Plan for Energy
Efficiency states:
The most common primary measurement of energy efficiency costeffectiveness is the TRC, followed closely by the SCT. A positive TRC
result indicates that the program will produce a net reduction in energy
costs in the utility service territory over the lifetime of the program. The
distributional tests (PCT, PACT, and RIM) are then used to indicate how
different stakeholders are affected. Historically, reliance on the RIM test
has limited energy efficiency investment, as it is the most restrictive of the
five cost-effectiveness tests.80
77
ENERGY CTR. OF WIS., ENERGY EFFICIENCY GUIDEBOOK FOR PUBLIC POWER
COMMUNITIES 30 (2009), https://www.seventhwave.org/sites/default/files/guidebook.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QT74-FJ7E].
78
NAT’L ACTION PLAN FOR ENERGY EFFICIENCY, UNDERSTANDING COST-EFFECTIVENESS
OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY PROGRAMS: BEST PRACTICES, TECHNICAL METHODS, AND EMERGING
ISSUES FOR POLICY-MAKERS, at ES-1 (2008), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files
/2015-08/documents/cost-effectiveness.pdf [https://perma.cc/G47W-63KV].
79
Id. at ES-2; see also SEE ACTION IMPACT EVALUATION, supra note 73, at xv-xix
(describing frameworks and best practices for evaluating, measuring, and verifying utilityfunded energy efficiency programs); SYNAPSE ENERGY ECON., INC., THE DATABASE OF STATE
EFFICIENCY SCREENING PRACTICES (DSESP)—A RESOURCE OF THE NATIONAL EFFICIENCY
SCREENING PROJECT (E4TheFuture 2019), https://nationalefficiencyscreening.org/statedatabase-dsesp/ (follow “Download the DSESP” hyperlink, then enter information requested
and follow “Submit” if agreed to terms and conditions) (showing tests used in all fifty states).
80
NAT’L ACTION PLAN FOR ENERGY EFFICIENCY, supra note 78, at ES-2; see also ENERGY
CTR. OF WIS., supra note 77, at 30 (providing overview of cost-effectiveness tests); NAT’L
EFFICIENCY SCREENING PROJECT, NATIONAL STANDARD PRACTICE MANUAL: EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY, at vii-xiv (2017), https://nationalefficiencyscreening.org/wp-content/uploads
/2017/05/NSPM_Exec_Summary_5-17-17.pdf [https://perma.cc/9GQP-6VHK] (explaining
cost-effectiveness tests); Elizabeth Daykin, Jessica Aiona & Brian Hedman, Whose
Perspective? The Impact of the Utility Cost Test 8 (2011) (unpublished manuscript),
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Across all these tests, energy efficiency programs are generally evaluated for
cost-effectiveness to account for both free riders and “spillovers,” with
spillovers defined as “additional reductions in energy consumption or demand
that are due to program influences beyond those directly associated with
program participation.”81 According to the EPA, this is done through evaluating
the “net-to-gross ratio” (“NTG ratio”) across all program tests, which “deducts
energy savings that would have been achieved without the efficiency program
(e.g., ‘free-riders’) and increased savings for any ‘spillover’ effect that occurs as
an indirect result of the program.”82 Of course, identifying the impact of both
free riders and spillovers is extremely difficult, and there is a large body of
literature discussing various methods to obtain this information through surveys
and other data collection methods that is beyond the scope of this Article. 83
https://www.cadmusgroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/TRC_UCT-Paper_
12DEC11.pdf [https://perma.cc/2T4Z-6ULJ].
81
Daniel M. Violette & Pamela Rathbun, Estimating Net Savings: Common Practices, in
UNIFORM METHODS PROJECT 3 (2014), https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2015/01
/f19/UMPChapter17-Estimating-Net-Savings.pdf [https://perma.cc/9BKJ-U7VP].
Experts also attempt to evaluate the “rebound effect” associated with energy efficiency
programs, which refers to changes in consumer behavior to increase the use of energy, such
as raising the thermostat in the winter, using more air conditioning in the summer, and driving
more often or longer distances because of technical improvements in energy efficiency that
result in lower energy costs to consumers. Although experts agree that the direct-rebound
effect is real, there are significant debates over its magnitude. See, e.g., HOWARD GELLER &
SOPHIE ATTALI, INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, THE EXPERIENCE WITH ENERGY EFFICIENCY POLICIES
AND PROGRAMMES IN IEA COUNTRIES 5 (2005) (explaining rebound effect in energy efficiency
and summarizing studies); NAT’L ACTION PLAN IMPACT EVALUATION GUIDE, supra note 75,
at 5-2 (“Rebound is a change in energy-using behavior that increases the level of service and
results from an energy efficient action.”).
82
NAT’L ACTION PLAN FOR ENERGY EFFICIENCY, supra note 78, at ES-3; see also WILLIAM
P. SAXONIS, FREE RIDERSHIP AND SPILLOVER: A REGULATORY DILEMMA 533 (2007),
https://www.iepec.org/conf-docs/papers/2007PapersTOC/papers/62_1064_ab_585.pdf
[https://perma.cc/P84M-MZD2] (reviewing studies and literature on evaluating free ridership
and spillovers and reviewing data in New York on same); Violette & Rathbun, supra note 81,
at 3-4 (defining net and gross savings); Blumstein, supra note 75, at 6234 (“‘Spillover’ is the
other side of the free rider issue. Spillover occurs when the effects of an energy-efficiency
program spill over to affect other behavior. Examples of spillover would be a consumer taking
action as the result of an energy-efficiency program but not receiving any of the incentives
offered by the program (non-participant spillover) or a program participant stimulated to
pursue additional energy saving actions that are not subsidized by the program (participant
spillover).”).
83
See, e.g., PWP, INC. & EVERGREEN ECON., CURRENT METHODS IN FREE RIDERSHIP AND
SPILLOVER POLICY AND ESTIMATION 9-13 (2017), https://www.energytrust.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/07/FR_Spillover_170206.pdf [https://perma.cc/7R8A-996N]; SEE
ACTION GUIDE FOR STATES, supra note 63, at 39-49; SEE ACTION IMPACT EVALUATION, supra
note 73, at 5-1 to -11 (defining free riding, spillovers, and net savings in context of determining
cost-effectiveness of utility-funded energy efficiency programs); Judson Boomhower &
Lucas W. Davis, A Credible Approach for Measuring Inframarginal Participation in Energy
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Criticisms of Energy Efficiency Programs

As stated above, virtually all evaluations of utility-funded energy efficiency
programs attempt to evaluate the role of free riders and spillovers in determining
the cost-effectiveness of the program. Debates over the cost-effectiveness of
energy efficiency programs will undoubtedly continue, and experts will continue
to refine the methodological approaches to evaluating free riders. At the same
time, some scholars have questioned the scale of overall benefits of utilitysponsored energy efficiency programs from the outset. As early as the 1990s,
Professors Paul Joskow and Donald Marron argued that data from utility
companies did not bear out the grand claims of overall cost savings from utilityfunded energy efficiency programs because of the failure to account for free
riding.84 These criticisms led to significant changes in the measurement and

Efficiency Programs, 113 J. PUB. ECON. 67, 67 (2014) (using “regression discontinuity
analysis to examine participation in a large-scale residential energy-efficiency program” and
finding that “program participation increases with larger subsidy amounts, but that most
households would have participated even with much lower subsidy amounts”); Hunt Alcott
& Michael Greenstone, Measuring the Welfare Effects of Energy Efficiency Programs 1 (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 23386, 2017), https://www.nber.org/papers
/w23386.pdf [https://perma.cc/CG68-4YVG] (setting out “framework to evaluate the welfare
impacts of residential energy efficiency programs in the presence of imperfect information,
behavioral biases, and externalities, then estimat[ing] key parameters using a 100,000household field experiment”); Energy Efficiency Programs, ACEEE, https://aceee.org/portal
/programs [https://perma.cc/7QJW-X363] (last visited Feb. 18, 2020) (discussing founding of
ACEEE in 1980 during early period of energy efficiency programs to provide research and
policy development for utility energy efficiency); Evaluation, Measurement, and Verification
of Energy Data, ENERGY.GOV, https://www.energy.gov/eere/slsc/evaluation-measurementand-verification-energy-data [https://perma.cc/5UUL-6YLE] (discussing importance of
evaluation, measurement, and verification data to “inform recommendations for
improvements in [energy efficiency] program performance”); Utility Customer-Funded
Programs, BERKELEY LAB: ELECTRICITY MKTS. & POL’Y GROUP, https://emp.lbl.gov/projects
/utility-customer-funded [https://perma.cc/K3XR-WQBV] (last visited Feb. 18, 2020) (“The
EMP Group tracks and analyzes trends in utility ratepayer-funded energy efficiency programs
and enabling policies, and provides technical and policy support to regional authorities, state
regulatory commissions, and program administrators by analyzing current practices and
projected future spending and savings for efficiency programs.”).
84
Paul L. Joskow & Donald B. Marron, What Does a Negawatt Really Cost? Evidence
from Utility Conservation Programs, 13 ENERGY J. 41, 70-71 (1992); Paul L. Joskow &
Donald B. Marron, What Does a Negawatt Really Cost? Further Thoughts and Evidence,
ELECTRICITY J., July 1993, at 14, 16 (responding to criticisms of earlier paper). But see ETO,
supra note 62, at 10-12 (finding more savings attributable to energy efficiency programs than
reported by Joskow & Marron but acknowledging that not all utilities were effective at
running such programs).
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evaluation of the effectiveness of energy efficiency programs to address these
and other concerns and to ensure the cost-effectiveness of such programs. 85
More recently, in 2016, Professor Arik Levinson argued that despite forty
years of experience with energy efficiency programs, program benefits continue
to be overstated, particularly in the context of state energy building codes.86
Nevertheless, because of decades of experience with energy efficiency programs
and a general recognition that energy efficiency programs can provide benefits
for all ratepayers when designed properly, the debate has shifted toward how to
identify free riders to improve the cost-effectiveness of programs rather than
using free riding concerns as a reason to not have a program in the first place.
The same cannot be said for solar net metering programs and utility
investment in EV charging infrastructure. Utility subsidies for these programs
are subject to significant debate, with the role of free riders, “fairness,” and cross
subsidies at the center of arguments over whether these programs should exist
at all. The following Sections turn to these issues.
B.

Net Metering: Utility Compensation for Customer-Generated Rooftop
Solar Energy

One of the most frequent, contemporary uses of free riding arguments in
energy policy involves utility compensation for customer-generated rooftop
solar energy, also referred to as “distributed generation,” “distributed energy,”
or “distributed solar.”87 Beginning as early as the 1980s, states adopted policies
requiring electric utilities to compensate owners of rooftop solar panels for the
electricity generated by the solar panels that is sent back to the grid in order to
incentivize the adoption of rooftop solar.88 Such polices are often referred to as
“net metering” or “net energy metering” (“NEM”) because the electricity meter
85

See, e.g., GELLER & ATTALI, supra note 81, at 18-19 (discussing program designed to
account for free rider and spillover effects as result of criticisms by Joskow, Marron, and
others).
86
Arik Levinson, How Much Energy Do Building Energy Codes Save? Evidence from
California Houses, 106 AM. ECON. REV. 2867, 2892 (2016); see also Arik Levinson, Energy
Efficiency Standards Are More Regressive than Energy Taxes: Theory and Evidence, 6 J.
ASS’N ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECONOMISTS, Mar. 2019, at S7, S10-S13 (discussing shortcomings
of energy efficiency programs); David S. Loughran & Jonathan Kulick, Demand-Side
Management and Energy Efficiency in the United States, 25 ENERGY J. 19, 33-38 (2004)
(reviewing data and finding that actual electricity savings resulting from energy efficiency
programs were less than that reported by utilities).
87
See Richard L. Revesz & Burcin Unel, Managing the Future of the Electricity Grid, 41
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 43, 44 (2017) (“‘Distributed generation’ is a term used to describe
electricity that is produced at or near the location where it is used. Distributed generation
systems, also known as ‘distributed energy resources,’ can rely on a variety of energy sources,
such as solar, wind, fuel cells, and combined heat and power. Distributed solar energy is
produced by photovoltaic cells, popularly referred to as solar panels, which can be placed on
rooftops or mounted on the ground.” (footnotes omitted)).
88
Id. at 59-64 (describing history of net metering programs).
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on the home or commercial building now runs two ways: It meters electric
energy flowing to the customer when the solar panels are not providing all the
necessary electricity to the building, and it also meters the electricity flowing
back to the utility and the electric grid when the solar panels are producing more
electricity than the building requires.89 Over a monthly or yearly billing period,
the customer pays the “net” of the electricity the building uses and produces,
resulting in significantly lower electricity bills for the customer and, in some
cases, a net profit for the customer.90
In the Energy Policy Act of 2005,91 Congress provided additional support for
state net metering policies by encouraging states to adopt them and also to
provide tax benefits to customers installing solar generation.92 Although one can
argue that a sale of electric energy by a utility customer to the utility is a
wholesale sale of electricity subject to FERC jurisdiction under the Federal
Power Act, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 and numerous FERC decisions have
disclaimed federal jurisdiction over net metering and instead have encouraged
states to regulate the practice as a matter of state jurisdiction over retail sales. 93
As of 2019, thirty-nine states and the District of Columbia required utilities
to offer some form of net metering, and utilities in some of the remaining states
offer net metering programs on a voluntary basis. 94 “Conventional” net metering
compensates customers with solar panels at the retail electricity rate—the price
89
ALEXANDRA B. KLASS & HANNAH J. WISEMAN, ENERGY LAW 153-54 (2017); LAZAR,
supra note 3, at 78-79.
90
KLASS & WISEMAN, supra note 89, at 153-54. For a more detailed description of various
types of net metering, along with diagrams, see Net Metering & Compensation, MINN. PUB.
UTIL. COMM’N, https://mn.gov/puc/energy/distributed-energy/net-metering/ [https://perma.cc
/RS7K-F77K] (last visited Feb. 18, 2020).
91
Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (codified in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.).
92
Revesz & Unel, supra note 87, at 59-60; Residential Renewable Energy Tax Credit,
DSIRE, https://programs.dsireusa.org/system/program/detail/1235 [https://perma.cc/3MRG2UFH] (last updated Mar. 23, 2018).
93
See Sharon B. Jacobs, The Energy Prosumer, 43 ECOLOGY L.Q. 519, 534-36 (2016)
(describing rationale for jurisdictional “net metering fiction”); David B. Raskin, The
Regulatory Challenge of Distributed Generation, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. ONLINE 38, 42-45
(2013) (criticizing net metering as unfair subsidy and arguing for federal jurisdiction over net
metering); Revesz & Unel, supra note 87, at 59-60; Jim Rossi, Federalism and the Net
Metering Alternative, ELECTRICITY J., Jan.-Feb. 2016, at 13, 13-18 (disagreeing with Raskin
and arguing for continued state jurisdiction over net metering); see also STATE POWER
PROJECT, NET METERING AND FEDERAL/STATE JURISDICTION 1-2 (2016),
https://statepowerproject.files.wordpress.com/2015/05/net-metering-policymakersummary1.pdf [https://perma.cc/RBJ5-SNPZ] (summarizing Rossi’s argument).
94
Net Metering Policies, DSIRE (Oct. 2019), https://s3.amazonaws.com/ncsolarcenprod/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/DSIRE_Net_Metering_Oct2019.pdf
[https://perma.cc
/85CF-8264]; see also State Net Metering Policies, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES (Nov.
20, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/research/energy/net-metering-policy-overview-and-statelegislative-updates.aspx [https://perma.cc/V3T2-8TDU].
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the customer pays to buy electricity from the utility. 95 A few other states have
compensation rules that are not considered to be “net metering” because they
compensate customers at something other than the retail rate, such as a lower
wholesale rate, or they have a so-called “buy all, sell all” program where there
is one meter for the customer’s purchases of electricity and another meter for the
customer’s sale of electricity to the utility.96 As discussed in more detail below,
Minnesota has adopted a “Value of Solar Tariff” for designated utility purchases
of certain types of distributed solar generation that attempts to value the full
costs and benefits of solar energy on the grid and to avoid the bluntness of
compensating customer-generated solar energy based on a retail electricity rate
or a wholesale electricity rate.97
Beyond the rate of compensation, states vary considerably with regard to
other aspects of net metering programs. Many states have capacity limits on
individual customer solar systems, such as a 20 kilowatt (kW), 1 megawatt
(MW), or 10 MW size limit on the system, with twenty-three jurisdictions
imposing a size limit below 100 kW.98 Other states place limits on capacity
based on the customer’s total electricity load, such as Arizona’s limit of 125%
of the customer’s total load.99 States also have imposed limits on aggregate95

Retail electricity rates (the price end-use customers pay to the utility) are always higher
than wholesale electricity rates (the price at which the utility buys or sells electricity to or
from another wholesale provider of electricity, such as a neighboring utility, a utility-scale
wind farm, a natural gas generator, etc.). Wholesale electricity rates vary significantly based
on supply and demand and also based on the type of resource producing the electricity—
natural gas, coal, nuclear, wind, or solar energy. By contrast, retail electricity rates are set by
state public utility commissions and generally do not vary based on scarcity or resources, with
some exceptions, such as when a customer enrolls in a “time of use” program that ties retail
rates to low and high peak demand times of day. In most states, the “avoided cost rate” (the
cost of the utility to purchase energy as wholesale or generate the energy itself) is much lower
than the retail electricity rate. Revesz & Unel, supra note 87, at 60-61 (comparing avoided
cost rates in Wisconsin in 2015 of $0.03 to $0.04 per kWh to retail rates of $0.11 to $0.14 per
kWh); see also FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760, 769 (2016) (discussing
price fluctuations in wholesale rates based on demand and fact that state regulators generally
insulate retail customers from such rate fluctuations).
96
LAZAR, supra note 3, at 134-35 (discussing net metering in the states); Revesz & Unel,
supra note 87, at 47, 59-71 (discussing different state approaches to net metering and
distributed-energy compensation); see also Customer Credits for Monthly Net Excess
Generation (NEG) Under Net Metering, DSIRE (July 2016), http://ncsolarcenprod.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/NEG-1.20161.pdf [https://perma.cc
/8AHC-E5JZ] (showing net excess generation credits under statewide policies for investorowned utilities); State Net Metering Policies, supra note 94 (discussing states with “buy-allsell-all” approach).
97
See infra Section I.B.2.
98
Revesz & Unel, supra note 87, at 62-63. For comparison, three kW is common among
residential systems and ten MW is common among commercial and industrial systems, with
a lot of variation across both types of systems. Id. at 62.
99
See infra Section I.B.1.
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installed solar capacity within a utility’s service territory or within a state. For
instance, Georgia limits solar installations to 0.2% of a utility’s peak demand,
California has a cap of 5% of the utility’s peak demand, and Utah’s limit is 20%
of state peak demand.100 States also vary in how long customers can maintain
bill credits (e.g., next monthly billing period, twelve-month period, or
indefinitely) and whether the rate of compensation is uniform across all systems
in the state or varies based on system size.
When solar panels were few and far between, net metering was fairly
uncontroversial. However, as tax incentives, net metering, and a growing desire
for renewable energy encouraged more electricity customers to install solar
panels, utilities began to perceive a major threat to their future revenues from
electricity sales and sought regulatory relief from state public utility
commissions and legislative reform from state legislatures. One of the central
arguments utilities made in this context is that non-solar owners are subsidizing
solar owners. Because the utility’s fixed costs associated with maintaining the
electric grid are primarily recovered from customers through volumetric rates,
if solar owners are now purchasing 50-80% less electricity each year but the
utility still needs to maintain the same level of grid service for when the sun is
not shining, the utility will need to raise rates since they are selling less power
overall. When those rates go up, the increase will be disproportionately borne
by non-solar owners. Thus, utilities increasingly argue that non-solar owners
will now be unfairly shouldering a greater amount of those fixed costs, resulting
in a cross subsidy to solar owners and solar owners free riding on the grid.101
Notably, cross subsidies between different types of retail customers are
ubiquitous in the utility world.102 Customers who live in rural areas require more
distribution infrastructure to connect to the electric grid, so urban customers who
require less transmission infrastructure are arguably paying more than their “fair
share” of transmission line costs.103 Low-income customers often receive rate
discounts through state programs, and industrial customers receive favorable
100
Revesz & Unel, supra note 87, at 63 & n.146 (citing Database of State Incentives for
Renewables and Efficiency, DSIRE, https://www.dsireusa.org/ [https://perma.cc/CA56K92V] (last visited Feb. 18, 2020)).
101
See, e.g., Peskoe, supra note 3, at 218 (contending that utlities’ “focus on supposed cost
shifts among individual ratepayers is self-serving, and that [public utility commissions] have
routinely allowed or ignored potential cross subsidization among individual ratepayers,
particularly when subsidies benefit the utility system”); Rule, supra note 27, at 129-42
(cataloguing different fairness and cross subsidy arguments utilities make in context of
rooftop solar compensation); Shelley Welton, Clean Electrification, 88 U. COLO. L. REV. 571,
605 (2017) (“The fact that utilities so frequently filter their protectionist concerns through
discussions of equity . . . serves to underscore its importance in electricity law: utilities make
these arguments because they are aware that regulators care about the equities of clean energy
policies.”).
102
See Peskoe, supra note 3, at 121-29, 169-72; Revesz & Unel, supra note 87, at 76; Rule,
supra note 27, at 131-34.
103
Rule, supra note 27, at 131-34.
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rates from public utility commissions if those customers successfully argue that
they need those lower rates to remain competitive.104 In each of those cases,
there is a cross subsidy from one customer class to the other. As a legal matter,
however, the question is whether that cross subsidy is “unjust and unreasonable”
or discriminatory under state law rather than whether it exists at all. 105
Since approximately 2015, the “net metering wars” taking place in state
public utility commissions and state legislatures across the country have resulted
in many state commissions reducing the benefits associated with net metering
by placing new fixed charges and “demand” charges on solar customers,
compensating solar customers at something less than the retail rate, or imposing
new aggregate capacity limits on solar installations.106 In 2018, forty-five states
and the District of Columbia took some action with regard to distributed solar,
including making changes to net metering, fixed charges, minimum bill
increases, or community solar policies.107 In addition to efforts by utilities to
reduce the financial benefits of rooftop solar in state commissions, utilities have
worked closely with the American Legislative Exchange Council (“ALEC”) to
introduce model legislation in states across the country to ban or severely limit
net metering or to impose large, fixed fees on owners of solar panels.108
In these proceedings, investor-owned electric utilities and ratepayer advocacy
groups virtually always argue in favor of limiting or eliminating net metering
for rooftop solar. They argue that rooftop solar reduces overall utility revenues
104
Id. There are also cross subsidies between customers who use more electricity during
peak demand times and customers who do not. See Ian Schneider & Cass R. Sunstein,
Behavioral Considerations for Effective Time-Varying Electricity Prices, 1 BEHAV. PUB.
POL’Y 219, 6-7 (2017). Moving to “time of use” rates for all electricity customers minimizes
or eliminates that cross subsidy, but time-of-use rates are still rare among residential utility
customers in the United States. See Ahmad Faruqui, Residential Rates for the Utility of the
Future, BRATTLE GROUP (May 13, 2016), https://brattlefiles.blob.core.windows.net/files
/7291_residential_rates_for_the_utility_of_the_future_final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JP2Y7DKH]. For a discussion of time-of-use rates, see supra note 95.
105
See Peskoe, supra note 3, at 228-30.
106
See, e.g., id. at 260 (noting that in arguments before public utility commissions, utilities
“have launched a nationwide campaign against cross subsidies, in the name of consumer
protection. They argue that rate structures that have allowed [photovoltaic energy] to gain
traction are ‘unfair,’ ‘misleading’ to consumers, and ‘regressive.’ IOUs have also funded
media campaigns that have painted [photovoltaic] adopters as thieves who steal their
neighbors’ money while out-of-state billionaires reap the profits” (footnotes omitted));
Revesz & Unel, supra note 87, at 64-71 (discussing challenges in numerous states to net
metering); Welton, supra note 101, at 592-97 (discussing contentious state utility commission
proceedings over net metering and opponents’ “nationwide assault on the policy”).
107
AUTUMN PROUDLOVE, BRIAN LIPS & DAVID SARKISIAN, N.C. CLEAN ENERGY TECH.
CTR., 50 STATES OF SOLAR: Q3 2018 QUARTERLY REPORT 5 (2018),
https://nccleantech.ncsu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Q3-18_SolarExecSummary_
Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/5KQ6-N2ML] (describing policy changes to state net metering
laws).
108
Revesz & Unel, supra note 87, at 65.
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(through lost electricity sales) without also lowering utility fixed costs, and that
it will thus lead to increased electricity rates for customers to cover those fixed
costs. In turn, they argue, those higher rates will fall disproportionately on
nonsolar owners, who tend to be less wealthy than solar owners. The players on
the other side of the debate include (1) the rooftop solar industry—companies
like SolarCity, Sunrun, and Tesla109—which benefit financially from the
increased financial incentives net metering provides for rooftop solar
installations, and (2) environmental groups, which support the growth of rooftop
solar because it increases the penetration of renewable, distributed energy into
the electric grid; reduces reliance on fossil fuels; and reduces GHG emissions
and other fossil-fuel related pollutants.110
In a 2017 article on distributed solar and net metering, Professor Richard
Revesz and Dr. Burcin Unel surveyed many of the public benefits and costs
associated with distributed solar.111 The benefits to the electric grid include a
reduction in the utility system’s peak demand; a reduction in fuel and
transmission expenses; lower distribution-line power losses, because distributed
energy is closer to the end user; long-term costs savings to the system by
enabling deferral or complete avoidance of the cost of new power plants; and
resiliency benefits during storms and other power outages. The benefits to the
public include climate change benefits and health benefits through the
displacement of fossil fuels as well as more general environmental protection
benefits associated with water quality and land use benefits.112
Not surprisingly, free riding and cross subsidy arguments arise frequently in
the regulatory proceedings over distributed solar energy, as illustrated below.
Here is where a comparison to the use of free riding in the energy efficiency
context becomes helpful. Free riding concerns in energy efficiency programs
have been present for decades, and economists and other experts have developed
ways to address them.113 One can certainly question how accurate our ability to
evaluate free riders is in the energy efficiency context, but experts have at least
developed metrics to measure free riders and, even if they are far from perfect,
such metrics provide a platform for analysis and debate.
Regulators and experts are at a much earlier stage of data collection and
analysis when it comes to free rider concerns in the rooftop solar context. The
109

See Jacob Marsh, Solar Power Companies in the U.S.: Which Should You Choose?,
ENERGYSAGE (June 28, 2018), https://news.energysage.com/solar-power-companies-us/
[https://perma.cc/95ZW-PVPE] (providing overview for guidance on installing solar panels
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See Peskoe, supra note 3, at 154-55; Revesz & Unel, supra note 87, at 48-49 (discussing
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See supra Section I.A.3.
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question then becomes how much to support rooftop solar as these metrics are
being developed. Opponents of rooftop solar, including many investor-owned
electric utilities and other electricity providers, argue that states should eliminate
net metering in favor of much lower payments for rooftop solar energy because
the public benefits provided are limited.114 Supporters argue that states should
continue with net metering until we can more fully calculate the full systemwide benefits and public benefits provided by rooftop solar because we know
they exist. Further, they argue that regulators and legislatures should reduce
barriers to developing this energy resource.
A review of proceedings in Arizona, Nevada, and Minnesota surrounding
compensation for rooftop solar generation shows a range of approaches to this
question. In Arizona, the lack of information about the public benefits provided
by rooftop solar caused regulators to reduce net metering benefits.115 In Nevada,
the utility commission first followed suit but then reconsidered its decision and
used the lack of information as a reason to continue net metering until improved
metrics could be developed.116 And in Minnesota, the state legislature required
the state utility commission to adopt a “value of solar tariff” (“VOST”) to reduce
the information asymmetry between the electric utility and the public and to
begin to develop the types of metrics that exist in the energy efficiency
context.117
1.

Arizona and Nevada: Dueling Approaches to Uncertain Costs and
Benefits

In 2013, the Arizona Public Service Commission became one of the first state
utility commissions to revise a state net metering program to reduce the value of
rooftop solar in response to a utility claim of an unfair cost shift between
residential customers with solar panels and residential customers without solar
panels. The utility, Arizona Public Service (“APS”), filed an “Application for
Approval of Net Metering Cost Shift Solution” as “a solution to the cross
subsidization of customers with Net-Metering [distributed generation (“DG”)]
systems by those customers without such systems.”118 Notably, in its filing, APS
contended “that the issue is one of fairness to all customers and is not related to
a loss of revenue by APS because of [net metering].” 119 Prior to its filing, APS
114

See infra Section I.B.1.
See Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co., Application for Approval of Net Metering Cost Shift Solution,
Docket No. E-01345A-13-0248, at 3, para. 11 (Ariz. Corp. Comm’n Dec. 3, 2013) (order),
2013 WL 6384419, at *2, para. 11 [hereinafter 2013 Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co. Order].
116
Sierra Pac. Power Co., Application for Authority to Adjust Annual Revenue
Requirement, Docket Nos. 16-06006, 16-06007, 16-06008 & 16-06009, at 47 (Nev. Pub.
Utils. Comm’n Dec. 28, 2016) (order), 2016 WL 7635932, at *36 [hereinafter Sierra Pac.
Power Co. Order].
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hosted a technical conference to gather information and propose various
solutions, which it presented to the Commission with its application. 120
In its order ruling on the APS application, the Commission summarized the
Commission staff’s analysis of the issue and found that “integral to the
discussion of DG is the question of what value DG offers to APS’s electric
system and thereby to the customers served by that system.” 121 Staff found two
values inherent in DG systems: (1) objective value, which consists of
“measurable” benefits such as avoided fuel costs to the utility, although it
recognized that “[e]ven objective value can be difficult to predict in future time
periods”; and (2) subjective value, which “requires the subjective assignment of
monetary values to anticipated future benefits that are not easily measurable”
and can include “increased grid security and air quality improvements.” 122 The
Commission, based on the staff report, recognized that several studies existed
that attempted to quantify both objective and subjective values of DG, that
subjective value “is a public policy issue” that requires “a subjective assignment
of values consistent with policy goals,” and that both objective value and
subjective value would need to be addressed in the utility’s next general rate
case proceeding to quantify and value the costs and benefits of DG and
“allocate[] . . . these costs and benefits equitably among customers [as] a matter
of rate design.”123
As an interim measure, however, the Commission agreed with APS that some
additional costs and fees on solar customers were appropriate.124 It did not place
new fees on customers who already had installed solar panels but did place a
$0.70 per kW monthly interim charge on all DG customers with installations
after December 31, 2013 to “ameliorate the impact of the cost shift on residential
non DG customers.”125 This amount, which constituted the first approval of
fixed charges on solar customers in the United States, was significantly lower
than the $3.00 per kW per month amount it believed APS’s data could justify
(equivalent to an additional $21 per month for a customer system of 7 kW) and
the $70 per month APS said was warranted by the “cost shift issue” in a later
proceeding on the same issue.126
Contentious battles over how to value and compensate rooftop solar
generation continue in Arizona, with APS arguing that its customers “are bearing
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the brunt of the unfair cost shift” associated with continued net metering and
arguing for higher fixed fees on solar customers.127 What is important for
purposes of analysis here is the position of APS that there is an “unfair” cost
shift between customers with solar panels and customers without solar panels,
despite the fact that all parties recognized in the proceeding that it was very
difficult to value the benefits to the overall system associated with distributed
solar. If that value is high, then any current cost shift may not be unfair to any
customers and, in fact, may benefit all customers. This is particularly true if the
“value” of distributed solar includes creating markets for developing solar
technologies that can result in reduced carbon emissions, greater grid security
through distributed generation, and financial value from reducing the need to
build more fossil-fuel generation once energy storage technologies develop
sufficiently to support distributed solar. APS and other utilities may not “value”
those benefits because they may result in reduced revenues for the utility in the
short term, but that does not necessarily mean they are an unfair cost shift on
utility customers without solar panels or that customers with solar panels are free
riding on the utility system.
The analysis was somewhat different in Nevada a few years later in 2016. In
early 2016, the Public Utilities Commission of Nevada issued a “Modified Final
Order” that phased out net metering for residential customers in Nevada with
existing solar systems and tripled the “fixed charges” for those customers over
a period of years.128 This decreased the amount the utility paid customers for
rooftop solar from the $0.11 per kWh retail rate to a $0.02 per kWh wholesale
rate.129 It also resulted in an increase in fixed monthly charges on solar customers
from $12.75 per month to $38.50 per month.130 This action resulted in SolarCity
and other solar installation companies pulling their operations out of the state
entirely with a commensurate loss of solar-related jobs in the state.131 According
to the Commission itself, the “Modified Final Order all but crushed the rooftop
solar industry in Northern Nevada, reducing the booming industry from 983
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2015 Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co. Order, supra note 126, at 14, para. 103 (citation omitted).
Nev. Power Co., Application for Approval of a Cost-of-Service Study & Net Metering
Tariffs, Docket Nos. 15-07041 & 15-07042, at 146-53 (Nev. Pub. Utils. Comm’n Feb. 12,
2016) (modified final order) [hereinafter 2016 Nev. Power Co. Modified Final Order], 2016
WL 693151, at *91-95.
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See Revesz & Unel, supra note 87, at 66 (citing Krysti Shallenberger & Gavin Bade,
Nevada Regulators Approve NV Energy, SolarCity Grandfathering Proposal, UTIL. DIVE
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https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/nevada-puc-to-reconsider-grandfatheringrooftop-solar-customers-into-new-ne).
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2015, 3:23 PM), https://fortune.com/2015/12/24/solar-city-ditches-nevada/.
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applications by residential homeowners and small commercial businesses in
Sierra Pacific Power service territory in 2015 to [41] applications in 2016.”132
A significant driver of the Commission’s Modified Final Order eliminating
net metering was a 2015 statute enacted by the Nevada legislature—Senate Bill
374—in which the legislature directed the Commission to address solar cost shift
issues.133 The relevant provisions of the statute provided that the Commission
may establish different rate classes for customers with distributed solar; may
establish terms and conditions for participating in net metering, including limits
on enrollment in net metering “to further the public interest”; may allow a utility
to “establish just and reasonable rates and charges to avoid, reduce[,] or
eliminate an unreasonable shifting of costs from customer-generators to other
customers of the utility”; and shall not authorize rates or charges for net metering
“that unreasonably shift costs from customer-generators to other customers of
the utility.”134
In its order revisiting its decision, the Commission evaluated the record before
it with regard to the extent of any unfair cost shift from net metering customers
to non-net metering customers.135 It found the record “replete with conflicting
evidence regarding the existence of a cost shift,” with some studies showing that
the costs between customer classes will be “very nearly neutral” and total
benefits of $36 million over the lifetime of an average rooftop solar system.136
Other studies, however, showed exactly the opposite, with a significant cost shift
based in large part on the differential in price between utility scale solar and
rooftop solar, with utility scale solar available at significantly lower rates. 137
With this conflicting evidence before it, the Commission stated that what it
found most significant about the evidence submitted was that “credible and welleducated economists, engineers, [analysts], lawyers, and . . . businesses” failed
to agree on fundamental facts and methodologies relevant to the proceeding.138
The Commission considered that this was perhaps “due to Nevada being at a
cross-roads where traditional thinking is colliding with new technology and
disruptive business models—new ways of looking at old energy problems are
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Sierra Pac. Power Co. Order, supra note 116, at 38 (internal citation omitted).
S.B. 374, 2015 Leg., 78th Sess. (Nev. 2015) (codified at NEV. REV. STAT. § 704.7735),
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134
Sierra Pac. Power Co. Order, supra note 116, at 40.
135
Id. at 44-46.
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Id. at 45 (citing ENERGY & ENVTL. ECON., INC., NEVADA NET ENERGY METERING
IMPACTS EVALUATION 7 (2014), http://puc.nv.gov/uploadedFiles/pucnvgov/Content/About
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2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/RV3F-R4L8]).
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emerging.”139 The Commission also considered that these divergent views “may
also be because the facts regarding energy valuation, in many ways like the price
of other commodities, change and continually evolve. What a cost prohibitive
energy resource is today could very well be a fantastic value tomorrow.” 140 The
Commission continued:
Jumping to a premature conclusion for the mere sake of having a resolution
while the conversation and technology is evolving would not serve the
public interest and Nevada. No certain answer at this time is better than the
wrong one. More information, time, and analysis are necessary to find the
appropriate balance for Nevada.141
The Commission then stated that, in its prior order eliminating net metering,
it had recognized that the relevant factors for analyzing the positive and negative
effects of net metering included avoided energy, avoided capacity, reduced
energy losses/line losses, avoided CO2 emissions, avoided criteria pollutant
emissions, fuel hedging, utility integration and interconnected costs, and utility
administration costs.142 In that earlier order, according to the Commission, it had
“bound those factors to only those things which are ‘known and measurable’”
but, in doing so, “failed to fully account for other facts and policies—even those
difficult or impossible to objectively quantify—which should also be included
in a comprehensive NEM valuation analysis.”143 Moreover:
Until a universally-acceptable formula can be settled upon to determine
an appropriate value for NEM rooftop solar generation in Nevada,
questions regarding the existence of a cost-shift will remain unresolved.
More than “known and measurable” costs need to be included in this
analysis. However, how is monetary value to be placed on the prevention
of climate change? Clean air? Encouraging job growth? Grid diversity?
Energy choice and independence? Building a “New Nevada” for our
children?144
The Commission went on to find that even assuming the facts support a cost
shift from non-solar customers to solar customers, the relevant statute only
prohibited the Commission from approving an “unreasonable” cost shift.145 It
found that no unreasonable cost shift would occur because there would be no
“discernable cost increase” on the average monthly bill for customers without
distributed solar—approximately $0.26 per month—and that most customers
would experience a net decrease in the average monthly bill. 146 The Commission
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
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also noted that its determination of reasonableness in this case was guided by
the Nevada legislature’s stated policies supporting renewable energy, including
solar energy as a “mainstream alternative for homes.”147 Notably, within a year
after the Commission’s order, the Nevada legislature ratified the order by
repealing its earlier legislation148 and replacing it with provisions grandfathering
in existing customers with full net metering and reducing the rate only slightly
when certain installed capacity thresholds are met—for example, 95% of the
retail rate in the first 80 MW of installed capacity, with decreases for every
additional 80 MW installed until it flattens at a 75% rate of compensation. 149
As detailed in Part II, what is notable about the Nevada Commission’s order
is its treatment of the present-day uncertainties regarding the valuation of costs
and benefits of rooftop solar as compared with the Arizona Commission. 150 In
the face of the absence of hard data regarding present-day and long-term benefits
of rooftop solar, the Arizona Commission accepted the utility’s arguments and
assumed an unreasonable cost shift, while the Nevada Commission did exactly
the opposite.151 The Nevada Commission presumed that benefits to all customers
associated with increased solar generation may exist now and would likely
increase in the future.152 It found no existing cost shift between customer classes
that was unreasonable based on the evidence before it, and it relied on state
legislative policies supporting renewable energy to allow the market for rooftop
solar to develop and thrive in the state.153 By contrast, in Arizona, the
Commission saw its role more narrowly—to address the utility’s petition
regarding cost shifts taking place using the utility’s existing rate design, which
recovers both fixed and variable costs through volumetric electricity sales. 154 It
did not use the proceedings as an opportunity to question the rate design or to
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Metering, GREENTECH MEDIA (June 16, 2017), https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles
/read/nevadas-new-solar-law-is-about-much-more-than-net-metering (“Under the new law,
new solar customers will immediately begin to be reimbursed for the excess energy they
generate at 95 percent of the retail electricity rate. The credit is scheduled to decline . . . to a
floor of 75 percent of the retail rate.”).
150
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support a growing market for a form of energy generation that posed a direct
threat to the utility’s existing business model.155
2.

Minnesota: Moving Beyond Free Rider Arguments by Developing
New Metrics

Unlike Arizona and Nevada, where the commissions relied on more general
statutory language regarding just and reasonable rates in the context of rooftop
solar, in Minnesota the legislature directed the Commission to develop a new
method to compensate distributed solar energy.156 Specifically, in 2013, in
addition to using traditional net metering to compensate solar owners for
systems up to 1000 kW, the legislature allowed investor-owned utilities to
compensate utility customers and third-party solar owners based on “an
alternative tariff” that compensates solar generators “through a bill credit
mechanism for the value to the utility, its customers, and society for operating
distributed-solar photovoltaic resources interconnected to the utility system.” 157
The legislature required that this alternative tariff, known as the “Value of
Solar” tariff (also referred to as the “VOS rate” or “VOST”) be developed by the
Minnesota Department of Commerce no later than January 31, 2014, and be
approved, rejected, or modified with the Department’s consent by the Minnesota
Public Utilities Commission within sixty days of submission.158 In developing
the VOST, the Department of Commerce was required to “consult stakeholders
with experience and expertise in power systems, solar energy, and electric utility
ratemaking regarding the proposed methodology, underlying assumptions, and
preliminary data.”159 The VOST must, “at a minimum, account for the value of
energy and its delivery, generation capacity, transmission capacity, transmission
and distribution line losses, and environmental value.”160 The Department of
Commerce was also authorized but not required to consider “known and
measurable evidence of the cost or benefit of solar operation to the utility” and
incorporate “other values into the methodology, including credit for locally

155
See supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text (noting that Arizona Commission stuck
closely to analysis of existing inputs in cost-benefit analysis).
156
MINN. STAT. § 216B.164, subdiv. 1 (2019) (declaring statute’s intent to “give the
maximum possible encouragement to cogeneration and small power production consistent
with protection of the ratepayers and the public”).
157
Id. § 216B.164, subdiv. 10(a) (alternative tariff); id. § 216B.164, subdiv. 3(a) (net
metering).
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Id. § 216B.164, subdiv. 10(e).
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Id.
160
Id. § 216B.164, subdiv. 10(f). In Minnesota, part of the “environmental value” is
determined based on the “externalities” of various energy generation resources, including
criteria such as air pollutants and carbon emissions. See, e.g., id. § 216B.2422, subdiv. 3(a);
see also Further Investigation into Environmental and Socioeconomic Costs, Docket No. E999/CI-14-643, at 57 (Minn. Pub. Utils. Comm’n Jan. 3, 2018) (order updating environmental
cost values), 2018 WL 572293, at *52 (discussing requirements of statute).
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manufactured or assembled energy systems, systems installed at high-value
locations on the distribution grid, or other factors.”161
The legislature also required the state’s largest utility, Xcel Energy, to create
a program for “community solar gardens” defined as facilities that generate
electricity “by means of a ground-mounted or roof-mounted solar photovoltaic
device whereby subscribers receive a bill credit for the electricity generated in
proportion to the size of their subscription.”162 The other two investor-owned
utilities in the state are allowed but not required to offer a solar-garden
program.163 Solar gardens must be at a capacity of no more than 1 MW, and each
subscription
shall be sized to represent at least 200 watts of the community solar
garden’s generating capacity and to supply, when combined with other
distributed generation resources serving the premises, no more than 120%
of the average annual consumption of electricity by each subscriber at the
premises to which the subscription is attributed. 164
A solar garden must have at least five subscribers, and no single subscriber
may have more than a 40% interest in the garden.165 Solar gardens may be owned
by the utility or by a private solar development that contracts with the utility to
sell the output of the solar garden.166
The purpose of the solar garden statute was to allow residential and “general
service” customers (i.e., commercial, industrial, and public entities) to receive
the financial benefits of solar energy without the need for the up front capital
costs of purchasing solar panels and to encourage the development of a solar
industry in Minnesota.167 Eligible solar gardens “must be located in the service
territory of the public utility filing the plan” and subscribers must be retail
customers of the public utility located in the same county as the solar garden or
a contiguous county.168 The utility must purchase all energy that the community
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solar garden generates and the purchase shall be at the VOS rate or, until the
commission approves the VOS rate, at the applicable retail rate.169
The Minnesota Public Utilities Commission reviewed and approved the
VOST prepared by the Department of Commerce in April 2014.170 In its order,
the Commission began by stating that the Department of Commerce “intends for
the methodology to avoid cross subsidies and disincentives for conservation
inherent in net metering.”171 The Department’s methodology included eight
relevant components, chosen because they were values “based on known and
measurable evidence of the cost or benefit of solar operation to the utility”—
avoided fuel costs, avoided fixed plant operations and maintenance, avoided
variable plant operations and maintenance, avoided generation-capacity cost,
avoided reserve-capacity cost, avoided transmission-capacity cost, avoided
distribution-capacity cost, and avoided environmental costs.172 According to the
Commission, the components collectively “account for the value of energy and
its delivery, generation capacity, transmission capacity, transmission and
distribution line losses, and environmental value attributable to solar
[photovoltaics].”173 The Department also included two “placeholder
components” for future analysis—avoided voltage-control cost and solarintegration cost—on the grounds that these costs and benefits will be “known
and measurable in the future” and thus can be added to the calculation at that
time.174 The Department declined to include as components the “compliance”
value of Solar Renewable Energy Credits and the value of economic
development on grounds that such values were not known or measurable at that
time.175 The Department anticipated that additional value and cost components
would be added in the future “as more data and analysis becomes available about
distributed solar and its costs and benefits.”176
The Commission approved the Department’s methodologies with a few
modifications relating to fuel-price-escalator factor, calculating avoided
distribution-capacity costs, and non-CO2-avoided environmental cost values.177
Pursuant to the statute, the utility must submit an annual calculation for
Commission approval according to the Department of Commerce’s VOST
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methodology.178 Subscribers to community solar gardens must be reimbursed at
the VOST, but the utility can elect to use VOST or net metering for other types
of solar purchases such as customer-sited rooftop solar in the utility’s
territory.179 Since the first VOST was established, it has been a few cents less
than the retail rate used in traditional net metering.180
Despite the lower price of VOST, Xcel Energy has opted to continue to use
net metering when it can as a matter of risk mitigation because VOST prices
may fluctuate dramatically in the future, leading to more uncertainty with regard
to costs on the part of the utility.181 When the first community solar gardens
came online, the Commission directed Xcel to compensate subscribers using the
applicable retail rate with a renewable energy credit payment to provide
sufficient incentives to get the solar-garden program started and so stakeholders
to gain more experience with the program.182 In 2016, the Commission directed
Xcel Energy to transition its solar garden program to VOST because the
legislature directed it to do so; because VOST will “provid[e] predictable yearly
rate increases,” thus improving the ability of solar gardens to obtain financing;
because it would allow the utility to meet its solar-energy standard by purchasing
solar energy credits at a commission-approved price; and because VOST will
“address concerns that nonparticipating ratepayers are subsidizing the
program.”183 The Commission has also been working with Xcel to use “locationspecific avoided costs in calculating avoided distribution capacity” to ensure that
the benefits of solar gardens located near load and the costs of solar gardens
further from load are appropriately considered. Further, these avoided costs are
factored into the benefits associated with reducing peak demand and deferring
the need for distribution system upgrades.184
178

Id. at 16.
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changes to VOST “avoided distribution costs” calculation factor).
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Throughout the proceedings, the utilities, consumer advocacy groups, solar
developers, and others have disagreed about appropriate inputs, assumptions,
and other aspects of Minnesota’s VOST.185 Nevertheless, VOST provides a
framework to address the cost shift and free riding arguments inherent in
traditional net metering by creating identifiable inputs, cataloguing which inputs
are known and unknown, and allowing the Commission to refine the
methodology as needed to determine the costs and benefits of solar on the
utility’s system and statewide. VOST thus provides the primary alternative to
net metering that exists today, and it provides a pathway to move beyond the
free riding and cost shift arguments that will otherwise always be present in
debates over net metering.
C.

Electric Utility Investment in EV Charging Infrastructure

Utility investment in EV charging infrastructure provides a third illustration
of the use of free riding arguments in state energy policy. The debates in this
context are more recent than those involving energy efficiency, which have had
decades to develop, as well as those involving rooftop solar, which have been in
play since approximately 2013 and have reached virtually all states. 186 The
debates over utility investment in EV charging infrastructure existed in only a
few states prior to 2016, at which time an increasing number of state
commissions began to open dockets on the topic.187
1.

EV Sales in the United States and the Role of EV Charging
Infrastructure

EV sales in the United States have increased significantly in recent years,
constituting just over 2% of total vehicle sales in the United States in 2018, up

https://www.edockets.state.mn.us/EFiling/edockets/searchDocuments.do?method=showPou
p&documentId={002ECE6C-0000-C218-86FC-6D68DC732F45}&documentTitle=20198155427-0 [https://perma.cc/Q68F-5QN3] (discussing location-specific avoided-cost
calculations).
185
See, e.g., ELEFF, supra note 167, at 3 (discussing range of disputed issues surrounding
VOST and solar gardens since enactment of statutory provisions); Gabriel Chan, Matthew
Grimley & Nick Stumo-Langer, Comment Letter on Xcel Energy’s 2019 VOS Calculation 1
(Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.edockets.state.mn.us/EFiling/edockets/searchDocuments.do?
method=showPoup&documentId={009A5A67-0000-CC15-BF69-3E12D10B78DD}
&documentTitle=201811-148058-01 [https://perma.cc/SGT2-TNQ4] (discussing conceptual
errors, conceptual extensions, and process reforms for yearly VOS proceeding); Laura
Hannah, Xcel Energy’s Community Solar Program Hits Major Milestones in Year 3,
GREENTECH MEDIA (Dec. 21, 2017), https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/xcelenergy-community-solar-program-turns-three (discussing program developments and
debates).
186
See supra Section I.A (discussing utility-funded energy efficiency programs); supra
Section I.B (discussing utility compensation for customer-generated rooftop solar energy).
187
See Klass, supra note 8, at 567-74 (discussing state legislative and regulatory action).
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from just over 1% in 2017.188 That percentage is significantly higher in some
states—particularly California—where the percentage of EV sales in 2018
approached 10% of all vehicles sold.189 The growth of EVs has resulted from
improved battery technology as well as mandates that auto companies sell a
certain percentage of EVs in some U.S. states (led by California) as well as in
the European Union and China.190 As of June 2019, there were more than 1.27
million EVs on U.S. roads, and analysts project that there will be over 18 million
EVs in the United States by 2030.191 Since 2018, many major auto companies
have publicly embraced EVs and have announced plans to invest heavily in the
technology.192
Environmental groups—along with some U.S. states—strongly support
widespread EV adoption because it provides an opportunity to reduce the use of
oil and its related GHG emissions and other pollutants in the transportation

188

See Press Release, Jonathon Berman, Sierra Club, Electric Vehicle Sales Skyrocketed
in 2018 (Jan. 7, 2019), https://www.sierraclub.org/press-releases/2019/01/electric-vehiclesales-skyrocketed-2018 [https://perma.cc/BUM4-8M6W].
189
See EV Market Share by State, EVADOPTION, https://evadoption.com/ev-marketshare/ev-market-share-state/ [https://perma.cc/JSJ8-VA3Q] (last visited Feb. 18, 2020).
190
See Detailed Sales Data, VELOZ (Mar. 4, 2019), http://www.veloz.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/03/2_feb_2019_Dashboard_PEV_Sales_veloz.pdf [https://perma.cc
/A7K4-3RDT] (depicting chart of EV sales in California and nationally in 2019); Echo
Huang, China Buys One out of Every Two Electric Vehicles Sold Globally, QUARTZ (Feb. 18,
2019),
https://qz.com/1552991/china-buys-one-out-of-every-two-electric-vehicles-soldglobally/ (attributing growth in EV sales in China to government support to EV sector, tax
cuts for consumers, and government subsidies for carmakers); Strong Policy and Falling
Battery Costs Drive Another Record Year for Electric Cars, INT’L ENERGY AGENCY (May 30,
2018),
https://www.iea.org/newsroom/news/2018/may/strong-policy-and-falling-batterycosts-drive-another-record-year-for-electric-ca.html
[https://perma.cc/TZK2-KXAY]
(explaining that growth in EVs across China, Europe, and United States was motivated by
government policies).
191
See Electric Transportation, EDISON ELECTRIC INST., https://www.eei.org
/issuesandpolicy/electrictransportation/Pages/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/U3SX-RFBX]
(last visited Feb. 18, 2020) (giving overview of electric transportation in United States); see
also Jeffrey Ryser & Keiron Greenhalgh, US EV Sales Jump 72.5% on Year in 2018, Top
354,000, S&P GLOBAL (Jan. 3, 2019, 10:56 PM), https://www.spglobal.com/platts/en/marketinsights/latest-news/electric-power/010319-us-ev-sales-jump-725-on-year-in-2018-top354000 (reporting that 2018 was “break-out year” for EVs with “sales of more than 354,000
vehicles, or 72.5% more than the 199,000 EVs sold in the US in 2017”).
192
See, e.g., Mark Matousek, 40 Electric Cars You’ll See on the Road by 2025, BUS.
INSIDER NEDERLAND (July 11, 2019), https://www.businessinsider.nl/electric-cars-that-willbe-available-by-2025-2018-1/?fb_comment_id=1935043216559681_1936466436417359
&jwsource=cl [https://perma.cc/K2BJ-AVCG] (discussing auto companies’ investments in
new models of EVs); Dan Neil, Think Electric Vehicles Are Great Now? Just Wait . . . , WALL
STREET J. (Oct. 28, 2018, 10:28 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/think-electric-vehiclesare-great-now-just-wait-11545838139 (discussing growth in EV market).
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sector, which, as of 2018, emits more GHG emissions than any other sector.193
Moreover, although fossil fuels still made up over 63% of U.S. electricity
generation in 2018, that percentage is far less in many states and is declining
nationwide as a result of state renewable portfolio standards (“RPSs”) and
declining costs of utility-scale and distributed renewable energy. 194 As a result,
electrifying transportation is an important component of efforts worldwide to
reduce GHG emissions.
As part of its efforts to reduce statewide GHG emissions from the
transportations sector, California has enacted a Zero Emission Vehicle (“ZEV”)
mandate that requires auto companies to generate a certain number of “credits”
that come with the sale of EVs. Twelve other states have adopted the ZEV
mandate,195 and some of these ZEV states have also enacted legislative policies
to facilitate the development of widespread EV charging infrastructure to
increase consumer demand for EVs and reduce “range anxiety.” 196 During the
Obama Administration, the EPA granted California a preemption waiver under
the Clean Air Act to enact the ZEV standard, but the Trump Administration EPA

193
See Preliminary US Emissions Estimates for 2018, RHODIUM GROUP (Jan. 8, 2019),
https://rhg.com/research/preliminary-us-emissions-estimates-for-2018/
[https://perma.cc
/U79T-NGTE] (“The transportation sector held its title as the largest source of US [CO 2]
emissions for the third year running, as robust growth in demand for diesel and jet fuel offset
a modest decline in gasoline consumption.”).
194
See Nadja Popovich, How Does Your State Make Electricity?, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 24,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/12/24/climate/how-electricity-generationchanged-in-your-state.html (showing that over half of California’s electricity is generated
from renewable energy resources; that percentages are even larger in Idaho, Vermont, and
Washington; and that nearly 40% of Iowa’s electricity is generated from wind energy alone);
see also Frequently Asked Questions: What Is U.S. Electricity Generation by Source?, U.S.
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=427&t=3 [https://
perma.cc/4X7H-5ESR] (last updated Oct. 25, 2019).
195
See Catherine Morehouse, Minnesota, New Mexico Propose Clean Car Rules as Trump
Attacks California Standards, UTIL. DIVE (Sept. 26, 2019), https://www.utilitydive.com/news
/minnesota-new-mexico-propose-clean-car-rules-trump-california-auto-standards-emissionszev/563762/ [https://perma.cc/5BSA-EJH4] (discussing announcements from governors in
Minnesota and New Mexico to adopt California’s ZEV standards as well as lawsuit by states
against EPA and National Highway Traffic Safety Administration over regulatory action to
revoke preemption waiver); What Is ZEV?, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS (Aug. 7, 2012),
https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/what-zev
[https://perma.cc/VU75-UXEY]
(listing
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York,
Oregon, Rhode Island, and Vermont as ZEV states).
196
See Camille von Kaenel, Luring Electric Vehicle Buyers with Swift Charging, RollerSkating, GOVERNORS’ WIND & SOLAR ENERGY COALITION (Jan. 17, 2018), http://governors
windenergycoalition.org/luring-electric-vehicle-buyers-with-swift-charging-roller-skating
[https://perma.cc/7GEX-ZACT] (discussing industry, state, and utility efforts to build out
public EV charging stations to reduce range anxiety and support EV drivers).
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revoked it in 2019.197 Thus, the ability of California and the other states to
enforce the mandate is in question and is currently subject to litigation. 198
Electric utilities have the opportunity to play a central role in building out EV
charging infrastructure. This infrastructure includes not only charging stations
themselves but also distribution wires and related equipment necessary to power
the charging stations. With regard to the charging stations, private charging
companies such as Blink, ChargePoint, EVgo, and Greenlots have developed a
range of business models to support home and business charging.199 In addition,
the Volkswagen (“VW”) emissions cheating scandal resulted in a $14.7 billion
settlement in 2016 that required VW to provide $2.7 billion in funds for grants
to states to reduce diesel-related emissions; to build EV charging infrastructure;
and to create a new company, Electrify America, to spend $2 billion building
charging networks on interstate highways and in cities across the country. 200
These provisions of the VW settlement are a recognition that in order for
consumers to embrace EVs, sufficient EV charging infrastructure must be built
through a combination of EV charging stations on highway corridors and at
homes, workplaces, shopping centers, government buildings, and even gas
stations.201 It is well documented that the lack of EV infrastructure can present
197

See The Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient (SAFE) Vehicles Rule Part One: One National
Program, 83 Fed. Reg. 51,310, 51,331 (Sept. 27, 2019) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 85,
86 and 49 C.F.R. pts. 531, 533) (revoking California preemption waiver under Clean Air Act
for ZEV program that was granted in 2009).
198
See Morehouse, supra note 195 (“[A]ttorneys general from 23 states and the District of
Columbia, as well as Los Angeles and New York City filed a lawsuit against the
administration’s actions.”).
199
See Mark Kane, Four Charging Networks Control over 60% of Charging Points in
U.S., INSIDEEVS (Oct. 23, 2018, 7:14 AM), https://insideevs.com/news/340565/four-charging
-networks-control-over-60-of-charging-points-in-us/
[https://perma.cc/Q2JY-X8YK]
(describing business models of leading companies in electric car charging station industry).
200
INGRID MALMGREN & CASSIE POWERS, NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE ENERGY OFFICIALS,
VOLKSWAGEN SETTLEMENT: BENEFICIARY MITIGATION PLAN TOOLKIT 4-5, 37 (2017),
https://www.naseo.org/Data/Sites/1/naseo-vw-beneficiary-mitigation-plan-toolkit-final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YTG2-GC7T]; David Ferris, 7 Takeaways from a Wild Year for EVs,
ENERGYWIRE (Dec. 21, 2018), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060110359/ (noting that VW
needs to spend “several billion dollars on EV charging” and that most of that money is from
its “new subsidiary, Electrify America”).
201
Although the major oil companies generally oppose transportation electrification
because of its impact on market share, some companies see an opportunity for increased sales
of convenience store items if they install EV charging stations because customers will be
forced to spend more time at the stores while they wait for their cars to charge. See, e.g., Tina
Casey, It’s Over: Oil Giant Shell Doubles Down on EV Charging Stations, CLEAN TECHNICA
(Oct. 16, 2017), https://cleantechnica.com/2017/10/16/oil-giant-shell-doubles-ev-chargingstations/ [https://perma.cc/WBP8-EMA8] (reporting on oil company Royal Dutch Shell’s
decision to install EV charging stations at its gas stations in the European Union); Ken Doyle
& Erika Myers, Why Aren’t More Convenience Stores Installing Electric Vehicle Chargers?,
SMART ELECTRIC POWER ALLIANCE (Nov. 9, 2017), https://sepapower.org
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a “chicken and egg” or “market coordination” problem in which consumers will
not want to purchase an EV due to perceived lack of support, while no company
will invest in EV infrastructure because it does not see sufficient demand. 202
Who should build this infrastructure and who should pay for it, however, have
become hotly contested issues in state public utility regulatory proceedings and
state legislatures in recent years. Private charging companies and state
commissions were initially opposed to utility investment in EV charging
infrastructure, fearing that the utilities would stifle competition and overbuild
infrastructure in pursuit of profits.203 That opposition has softened considerably,
however, and led the California Public Utilities Commission to reverse its
position on the issue when it determined that substantial private infrastructure
investment would not emerge until regulated utilities were permitted to enter the

/knowledge/arent-convenience-stores-installing-electric-vehicle-chargers/ [https://perma.cc
/69K3-MQWT] (discussing financial benefits of EV chargers for service stations and
convenience stores, including “revenue from non-fuel sales, such as food, drinks and ice”);
David Ferris, Chevron Makes Landmark Investment in Chargers, ENERGYWIRE (May 21,
2019), https://www.eenews.net/energywire/2019/05/21/stories/1060369775 (reporting that
Chevron will offer charging stations at some gas stations because “highest-margin product is
actually the coffee and the chips and drinks inside, not the gas outside”); Jenny Mandel, Shell
Establishes U.S. Charging Base by Buying Greenlots, ENERGYWIRE (Feb. 1, 2019),
https://www.eenews.net/energywire/stories/1060119225 (reporting that Shell bought
Greenlots, “an EV-charging and power management company,” in order to make charging
stations “more accessible and more attractive to utilities, businesses and communities”);
Christa Marshall & Blake Sobczak, First U.S. Gas Station to Switch to 100% EVs Opens,
ENERGYWIRE (Sept. 30, 2019), https://www.eenews.net/energywire/stories/1061182039
(reporting on EV refueling stations in Maryland and gas stations in other states that have
added EV chargers to their offerings).
202
See, e.g., Fresh Energy, Natural Resources Defense Council, the Sierra Club, and
Minnesota Center for Environmental Advocacy, Initial Comments on Commission Inquiry
into Electric Vehicle Charging and Infrastructure, Docket No. E999/CI-17-879, at 17 (Minn.
Pub. Utils. Comm’n July 27, 2018) [hereinafter CEO Initial Comments],
https://www.edockets.state.mn.us/EFiling/edockets/searchDocuments.do?method=showPou
p&documentId={80FFDC64-0000-CF18-AE69-6C936C279BF4}&documentTitle=20187145282-01 [https://perma.cc/TU6H-ZTX8] (describing market coordination problem); Adele
Peters, Want Electric Vehicles to Scale? Add Chargers to Gas Stations, FAST COMPANY (Oct.
8, 2018), https://www.fastcompany.com/90247078/want-electric-vehicles-to-scale-addchargers-to-gas-stations [https://perma.cc/9W3T-ZM9U] (discussing “chicken and egg”
problem in context of EV charging and potential solutions).
203
Klass, supra note 8, at 584.
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market.204 Other state commissions, as well as state legislatures, have quickly
followed suit.205
2.

State Regulatory Proceedings Governing Utility Investment in EV
Charging

Regulators, scholars, auto manufacturers, environmental advocacy groups,
and electric utilities nationwide are still struggling to determine best practices
for cost-effective EV charging infrastructure investment. Nonetheless,
proponents have pointed out that EV adoption has substantial benefits, including
“great potential to dramatically reduce local air pollution, greenhouse gas
emissions and resulting climate change impacts, and oil use from the transport
sector.”206 Widespread EV adoption could also lead to lower electricity rates by
better allocating grid load to more optimally use all power generated.207 On the
other hand, EV adoption is not without potential downsides, especially if EVs
spike electricity demand at peak demand times. 208
204

Id. (noting that state commission approved utility investment after “strong business
case for non-utility public EV charging did not materialize”); David Roberts, Electric Vehicles
Are Gaining Momentum, Despite Trump, VOX (July 18, 2018, 10:28 AM),
https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2018/6/26/17500074/electric-vehicles-evszevs-fuel-trump [https://perma.cc/8EYE-JG7G].
205
See Jeffrey Tomich, In Car-Loving Mich., an EV Master Plan Takes Shape,
ENERGYWIRE (Jan. 14, 2019), https://www.eenews.net/energywire/stories/1060111745/
(discussing approval of Michigan utility Consumers Energy’s $10-million investment that
was supported by private charging industry and was designed to “future-proof” charging
network to allow for future technology developments and avoid stranded assets); Herman K.
Trabish, The Keystone State May Have Found the Key to the Next Wave of Transportation
Electrification, UTIL. DIVE (Jan. 11, 2019), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/the-keystonestate-may-have-found-the-key-to-the-next-wave-of-transportatio/545008/ [https://perma.cc
/Q7MR-J89V] (reporting on collaboration by utilities, regulatory bodies, and legislature for
EV charging plan in Pennsylvania that includes major utility and private sector investments);
Robert Walton, Michigan Regulators Approve DTE $273M Rate Increase, EV Pilot, Net
Metering Replacement, UTIL. DIVE (May 3, 2019), https://www.utilitydive.com/news
/michigan-regulators-approve-dte-273m-rate-increase-ev-pilot-net-metering/554027/
[https://perma.cc/FN5N-KYQW] (reporting on approval of Michigan utility DTE Energy
three-year EV program investing $13 million in “incentives for residential and non-residential
chargers, along with education and outreach and a school bus charging program”).
206
DALE HALL & NIC LUTSEY, INT’L COUNCIL ON CLEAN TRANSP., EMERGING BEST
PRACTICES FOR ELECTRIC VEHICLE CHARGING INFRASTRUCTURE, at iii (2017),
https://www.theicct.org/sites/default/files/publications/EV-charging-best-practices_ICCTwhite-paper_04102017_vF.pdf [https://perma.cc/XS5R-M722].
207
Lisa Cohn, Should All Utility Customers Pay for EV Infrastructure and Microgrids?,
MICROGRID KNOWLEDGE (June 22, 2018), https://microgridknowledge.com/ev-infrastructurerate-based-microgrids/ [https://perma.cc/QY8R-NUNG].
208
HALL & LUTSEY, supra note 206, at 24 (citing concern of extensive demand from
“drivers plugging in after arriving home from work”). This could be particularly problematic
as solar power plays an increasingly large role in nationwide grids if EV owners opt to charge
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As noted above, utilities have been central actors in efforts to expand EV
charging infrastructure. Many of the ZEV states have enacted legislation
authorizing utilities to recover their costs and receive a rate of return on
investments in EV charging infrastructure.209 Indeed, state legislatures and
regulatory commissions have justified requiring all utility customers to pay for
these investments based on evidence of the system-wide public benefits noted
above—namely, reduced GHG and other air pollutant emissions associated with
transportation electrification and the potential for reduced electricity rates
stemming from more efficient electric grid utilization. 210
State public utility commissions approved major utility investments in EV
charging infrastructure in 2018, including nearly $740 million in California,
more than $20 million in Massachusetts, and $10 million in Ohio.211 As of the
end of 2018, utility proposals related to EV charging infrastructure filed with
utility commissions in eighteen states for review and approval in 2019 totaled
$1.5 billion.212 Each of these proposals would allow utilities to recover a rate of
their EVs at home after the sun sets. Id. (“This could be compounded by increasing use of
solar power, which may decline in output at the same time of day that charging demand
spikes.”). However, Hall and Lutsey hypothesize that improvements in technology may
eliminate this issue. See id.
209
See Klass, supra note 8, at 583-89, 592-94. There are three primary regulatory models
for utility investment in EV charging infrastructure: (1) the “make-ready model,” where the
utility owns the traditional utility infrastructure, such as the transformers, utility services,
meters, conduits, and wiring that supports the charging station, but the “site host,” such as a
parking lot or shopping mall, contracts with a private charging company like ChargePoint or
Greenlots for the purchase and maintenance of the station itself; (2) the “end-to-end model,”
where the utility owns the charging station itself in addition to the utility infrastructure
required to support the station; and (3) a “hybrid model,” where the utility has end-to-end
ownership in underserved markets, such as multifamily housing or low-income areas, but only
“make-ready” ownership in more competitive arenas, such as workplace charging or public
charging. See CEO Initial Comments, supra note 202, at 13-16 (discussing models of utility
investment in EV charging infrastructure).
210
See HALL & LUTSEY, supra note 206, at 24; infra notes 229-30 and accompanying text
(discussing evidence submitted in Illinois Commission proceeding by environmental groups
showing efficiency benefits and lower electricity rates for all electricity customers resulting
from transportation electrification).
211
Ferris, supra note 200.
212
Id.; see also Baltimore Gas and Electric Company et al., Additional Comments of the
Signatory Parties in Further Support of the Petition for Implementation of a Statewide Electric
Vehicle Portfolio, Case No. 9478, at 7-11 (Md. Pub. Serv. Comm’n Aug. 30, 2018),
https://webapp.psc.state.md.us/newIntranet/Casenum/NewIndex3_VOpenFile.cfm?filepath=
//Coldfusion/Casenum/9400-9499/9478/Item_86\JointSignatoriesComments_FF.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q99Y-WLSL] (summarizing utility proposals nationwide for EV charging
investments); Gavin Bade, 10 Trends Shaping the Electric Power Sector in 2019, UTIL. DIVE
(Jan. 2, 2019), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/10-trends-shaping-the-electric-powersector-in-2019/545119/ [https://perma.cc/NM4T-F3HA] (noting that in third quarter of 2018
alone, “32 states and D.C. took some action on electric vehicles, including the approval of
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return on their investments, similar to traditional utility investments in electricity
generation, transmission, and distribution assets.213
Although there are familiar free riding arguments in the EV charging
infrastructure context, some of the key players in these debates have “switched
sides” from the rooftop solar proceedings. Because of the anticipation of
increased profits from EV charging infrastructure investments and increased
electricity sales,214 utilities may favor policies encouraging EV adoption and
utility-owned EV charging. Thus, utilities are aligned with environmental
groups in these proceedings in arguing that such investments will ultimately
provide system-wide benefits to all ratepayers, even those who do not currently
own EVs. On the other side, many ratepayer advocacy groups oppose utility
investment in EV charging infrastructure. They argue that such incentives will
result in free riding and unfair cross subsidies by providing financial benefits to
EV owners that will be paid for disproportionately by non-EV owners who, like
non-solar owners, tend to have lower incomes.215 But there are also new
advocates making free riding arguments when it comes to EV charging—the oil
companies.216 Like the utilities in the rooftop solar debates, the oil companies
utility EV charging programs in Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and earlier, in Nevada”);
Evannex, 2018 EV Recap: The Year of the Electric Vehicle and Tesla Prevails, INSIDEEVS
(Dec. 31, 2018, 9:35 AM), https://insideevs.com/news/341847/2018-ev-recap-the-year-ofthe-electric-vehicle-and-tesla-prevails/ [https://perma.cc/D4XG-CSB4] (summarizing state
commission approval of utility investment in EV charging infrastructure); Michigan Approves
Consumers Energy EV Charging Program, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Jan. 9, 2019),
https://apnews.com/ac34aaed4df64d8091834e7aed3e9b6a [https://perma.cc/2EVT-SG8S]
(reporting on approval of utility’s three-year, $10 million pilot program that includes fivehundred-dollar rebate for consumers who purchase an EV and sign up for utility’s time-ofuse rate to encourage nighttime charging and $5000 rebates for purchases of chargers installed
in public areas like workplaces and multiunit dwellings).
213
Klass, supra note 8, at 569.
214
Utilities only benefit from increased electricity sales due to EV or any other increased
load in states that have not “decoupled” utility revenues from electricity sales. See supra notes
69-70 and accompanying text (discussing decoupling policies).
215
Press Release, The Util. Reform Network, PG&E Ignores CPUC Order, Demands
Excessive, Unnecessary Electric Vehicle Charging Experiment (Mar. 23, 2016),
http://www.turn.org/press-release/pge-ignores-cpuc-order-demands-excessive-unnecessaryelectric-vehicle-charging-experiment/ [https://perma.cc/N65H-A7BS] (arguing that cost of
utility-funded EV expansion will fall on customers and that unless subsidies for buying EVs
are also provided, charging stations will not be used in low-income areas).
216
See Evannex, supra note 212 (discussing how, in 2018, oil companies “stepped up their
efforts in Washington and state capitals” to oppose policies that support EVs); Catherine
Morehouse, Minnesota Shuts Down Oil, Manufacturing Groups’ Attempt to Derail Xcel EV
Pilot, UTIL. DIVE (Oct. 9, 2019), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/minnesota-shuts-downoil-manufacturing-groups-attempt-to-derail-xcel-ev-p/564637/
[https://perma.cc/M76ZFJF4] (reporting on oil companies’ opposition to utility-funded EV charging projects in
Minnesota); Jeffrey Tomich, Big Oil Looks to Stop Utilities’ Charging Investments,
ENERGYWIRE (Oct. 25, 2018), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060104353 (reporting on
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are using free riding, cross subsidy, and “fairness” rhetoric to argue that utility
customers will be hurt by these programs and that such programs are not “just
and reasonable” as required by state statutes governing utility rates. 217
In the most recent of these proceedings, it was clear that proponents of utility
investment in EV charging have learned from the contentious rooftop solar net
metering disputes and have marshaled more sophisticated empirical evidence to
support system-wide benefits of transportation electrification that requires EV
charging programs. They also have the advantage of the utility supporting rather
than opposing the program. For instance, in the net-metering context, it is
generally the utility that files a request with a state commission to eliminate net
metering or impose fixed charges on solar customers, putting solar advocates in
a defensive posture to justify the continuation of a net-metering program. 218
Moreover, supporters of net metering necessarily have more limited information
on current costs and benefits of rooftop solar to the electric grid than the utilities
possess. By contrast, when it comes to EV charging infrastructure, utilities are
generally aligned with environmental groups. Collectively, such groups are
making affirmative requests to state commissions to approve EV charging
investment proposals and providing evidence of public benefits to support the
proposals.
The remainder of this Section focuses on regulatory proceedings in Illinois,
Missouri, and Maryland regarding utility investment in EV charging. These state
proceedings show a range of arguments and analysis relating to free riding. This
group of states also includes both ZEV and non-ZEV states, which impacts
whether free riding and cross subsidy arguments are used to oppose programs in
their entirety or modify them to ensure that any program approved is costeffective. As a general matter, in non-ZEV states, advocates cannot rely on a
specific legislative or executive policy to support EV adoption or utility
investment in EV charging infrastructure and instead must rely on more general
state law governing “just and reasonable” rates.219 This lack of legislative
efforts by American Petroleum Institute, American Fuel and Petrochemical Manufacturers,
and others to lobby state utility commissions and Congress not to allow utilities to build EV
charging infrastructure). This recent activity is part of a larger campaign by U.S. oil
companies to retain market share in the transportation sector. The New York Times reported
in December 2018 that the major U.S. oil companies had worked behind the scenes to
encourage the Trump Administration to repeal the Obama Administration’s signature vehicle
fuel efficiency standards and vehicle emission standards; to discourage new states from
adopting California’s more stringent vehicle emission standards; and to work to revoke
California’s authority to set its own vehicle emission standards for GHG emissions, including
the state’s ZEV program. See Hiroko Tabuchi, Big Oil Angles, Quietly, to Ease Emissions
Cuts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2018, at A1.
217
See infra notes 240-48, 264-65, 289-90, and accompanying text.
218
See generally, e.g., 2013 Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co. Order, supra note 115; N. States Power
Co. Order, supra note 180; Sierra Pac. Power Co. Order, supra note 116.
219
Some states have adopted California’s ZEV mandate through legislation while others
have done so through executive action. See Klass, supra note 8, at 578. Many ZEV states have
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direction gives opponents of utility investment in EV charging stronger grounds
to oppose such programs because there has not been a legislative recognition of
the public benefits of EVs and EV charging like in California and other ZEV
states.220
Finally, the proceedings in all three states highlight how oil companies and
their trade associations are reacting to the threat of EVs and employing free
riding, fairness, and cross subsidy arguments in the name of utility customers to
oppose these programs.221 Thus, the oil companies have taken on the mantle of
protecting the utility customers from programs allegedly rife with free riding just
as the utilities have done in the rooftop solar context.
a.

Illinois

In September 2018, the Illinois Commerce Commission initiated a Notice of
Inquiry proceeding to gather “information and opinions from stakeholders on
electric vehicles (‘EVs’) to help the Commission identify issues, potential
challenges, and opportunities in EV deployment.”222 The Commission’s goal
was to use the proceeding “for studying and understanding the technical,
financial, and policy implications of electric vehicles.” 223 The Notice of Inquiry
asked participants to respond to a range of issues including the impact of EVs
and EV charging infrastructure on energy efficiency and grid reliability in the
state, the costs and environmental benefits associated with EV deployment, and
whether utilities should own EV charging stations and be allowed to include
such investments in the utility’s rate base.224
The Notice of Inquiry prompted a range of comments from the state’s two
investor-owned utilities, Ameren Illinois and Commonwealth Edison;
environmental and energy efficiency groups; ratepayer advocates; the Illinois
Attorney General’s Office; industrial utility customers; an oil company trade
also adopted specific legislation supporting EVs in general and utility investment in EV
charging stations in particular. See id. at 583-90.
220
For a discussion of state public utility commission proceedings in ZEV states, see
Ferris, supra note 200 (summarizing developments in the states); Klass, supra note 8, at 57790.
221
See, e.g., Tomich, supra note 216 (reporting that oil industry argued to Illinois
Commerce Commission that “[c]onsumers and taxpayers should not be forced to pay more in
taxes, fees and/or electric utility rates so that someone else can purchase and operate an
expensive electric vehicle”).
222
Notice of Inquiry Regarding Electric Vehicles, ILL. COM. COMMISSION,
https://www.icc.illinois.gov/Electricity/workshops/evnoi.aspx
[https://perma.cc/TM8V2AWB] (last visited Feb. 18, 2020) (describing Notice of Inquiry and providing links to all
comments submitted in proceeding and relevant news articles); see also Notice of Inquiry
Regarding Electric Vehicles, No. 18-NOI-01, at 3 (Ill. Commerce Comm’n Sept. 24, 2018)
[hereinafter Ill. Commerce Comm’n NOI], https://www.icc.illinois.gov/downloads/public/ev
/EV%20NOI.pdf [https://perma.cc/N4VL-W2U2].
223
Notice of Inquiry Regarding Electric Vehicles, supra note 222.
224
Ill. Commerce Comm’n NOI, supra note 222, at 4-7.
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association; Americans for Prosperity (a political advocacy group funded by the
Koch brothers); EV charging companies; and others.225
Not surprisingly, Ameren Illinois and Commonwealth Edison both supported
regulatory policies to encourage transportation electrification and utility
investment in EV charging infrastructure, along with market approaches that
included private EV charging companies.226 The utilities also focused their
comments in large part on how such programs would work in tandem with
existing energy efficiency programs in the state to increase grid efficiencies and
provide cost and environmental benefits for all utility customers.
Commonwealth Edison cited U.S. Department of Energy statistics showing
that conventional vehicles convert only about 17% to 21% of the energy stored
in gasoline to vehicle power, while EVs convert about 59% to 62% of electric
energy from the grid to vehicle power.227 It also cited potential energy efficiency
opportunities of electric buses as compared to diesel buses.228 The utility was
careful to note that it was not using these statistics to argue that transportation
electrification contributed directly to the utility’s energy efficiency program
established under the 2016 Future Energy Jobs Act,229 but it did state that
“additional EV charging stations could directly impact the Company’s Energy
Efficiency Program if the Program is able to incent and claim savings from
energy efficient charging stations.”230 Commonwealth Edison further focused
on how pricing signals through time-of-use rates would encourage EV users to
charge at low-demand times, resulting in better utilization of grid resources, and
“could put downward pressure on per kWh rates.”231
Commonwealth Edison also cited an M.J. Bradley & Associates study
showing the environmental benefits of wide-scale EV adoption through reduced
225

See Notice of Inquiry Regarding Electric Vehicles, supra note 222.
Ameren Illinois Company, Initial Comments in Response to NOI Questions and Issues,
No. 18-NOI-01, at 17 (Ill. Commerce Comm’n Oct. 23, 2018), https://www.icc.illinois.gov
/downloads/public/evnoi/18-NOI-01%20Ameren%20Illinois%20Initial%20Comments.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2ZVY-HTDB]; Commonwealth Edison Company, Initial Comments on
Notice of Inquiry Regarding Electric Vehicles, No. 18-NOI-01, at 10 (Ill. Commerce Comm’n
Oct. 22, 2018), https://www.icc.illinois.gov/downloads/public/evnoi/ComEd%20-%20NOI
%20Comments.pdf [https://perma.cc/P8HJ-Y2KW].
227
Commonwealth Edison Company, supra note 226, at 2.
228
Id. (citing studies finding that “compared to 4.2 miles per diesel gallon achieved by
traditional diesel transit buses, electric buses can achieve the equivalent of up to 17.3 miles
per diesel gallon” (footnote omitted)).
229
See Future Energy Jobs Act, 220 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-103B(a) (2019) (requiring
utilities “to use cost-effective energy efficiency and demand-response measures to reduce
delivery load”); Press Release, Commonwealth Edison Co., New Energy Efficiency Benefits
Coming to Illinois Consumers (June 28, 2017), https://www.comed.com/News/Pages
/NewsReleases/2017_06_28.aspx [https://perma.cc/NK76-CN57] (announcing that utility
would be filing new efficiency program plan under Future Energy Jobs Act).
230
Commonwealth Edison Company, supra note 226, at 3.
231
Id. at 7.
226
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GHG emissions, reduced vehicle noise, and other aesthetic benefits. 232 It
stressed that utility programs for EV charging could target “low-income
communities not currently being served by the competitive EV charging market”
to increase EV adoption in those communities as well as to make way for electric
buses and trains in underserved neighborhoods.233 Ameren’s comments were
similar, focusing on the “economic benefits that can be socialized to all utility
customers, most notably the potential downward rate pressure that can result
from EV owners charging their vehicles.” 234
Environmental and energy nonprofit groups focused their comments on
expert studies showing that EVs “provide the opportunity for broad-based cost
savings for ratepayers” as well as “improved security from reduced dependence
on imports of conventional fuels, improved local air quality, and reduced
greenhouse gas emissions.”235 They also cited studies showing that increased
EV adoption, coupled with time-of-use rates and other “smart charging”
programs, “can actually reduce costs for all ratepayers while benefiting the grid
and providing a range of societal benefits.”236 The Sierra Club and Natural
Resources Defense Council stressed that transportation electrification is “not at
odds with the utilities’ statutorily-defined energy efficiency goals” and that EVs
themselves “are a form of energy efficiency because they reduce total energy
consumption” as compared with conventional vehicles. 237
ChargePoint also filed supportive comments. It cited studies showing that
transportation electrification had the potential to “create value for all ratepayers”
because “the expected long-term energy revenues from incremental EV load
generally exceeds the costs for the grid to support that load,” which will “exert
a downward pressure on unit energy costs that can benefit all utility customers

232
Id. at 7-8 (citing M.J. BRADLEY & ASSOCS., ELECTRIC VEHICLE COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS 14 (2017), https://mjbradley.com/sites/default/files/IL%20PEV%20CB%20
Analysis%20FINAL%2026sep17.pdf [https://perma.cc/VP6Z-TFGE]).
233
Id. at 9.
234
Ameren Illinois Company, supra note 226, at 1.
235
Advanced Energy Economy, Comments on Notice of Inquiry Regarding Electric
Vehicles, No. 18-NOI-01, at 1 (Ill. Commerce Comm’n Oct. 23, 2018),
https://www.icc.illinois.gov/downloads/public/evnoi/AEE%20Comments%20ICC%20EV%
20NOI%2010-23-18.pdf [https://perma.cc/8MBZ-CNVU]; see also Sierra Club and Natural
Resources Defense Council, Comments on Notice of Inquiry Regarding Electric Vehicles,
No. 18-NOI-01, at 2 (Ill. Commerce Comm’n Oct. 23, 2018), https://www.icc.illinois.gov
/downloads/public/evnoi/Sierra%20Club%20and%20NRDC.pdf [https://perma.cc/8GKATSEF]; Union of Concerned Scientists, Comment Letter on Notice of Inquiry Regarding
Electric Vehicles, No. 18-NOI-01, at 3-4 (Ill. Commerce Comm’n Oct. 23, 2018),
https://www.icc.illinois.gov/downloads/public/evnoi/2018_UCS%20Comment%20to%20IC
C%2018_NOI_01_withAppendicies.pdf [https://perma.cc/3KTE-M3S7].
236
Advanced Energy Economy, supra note 235, at app. A at 14.
237
Sierra Club and Natural Resources Defense Council, supra note 235, at 2, 4.
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regardless of EV ownership.”238 ChargePoint cautiously supported ratepayer
funding of utility investment in EV charging, citing specific criteria developed
in other jurisdictions and highlighting the need to “maintain customer choice,
encourage innovation, and stimulate competition.” 239
Some of the strongest opposition to ratepayer-funded utility investment in EV
charging infrastructure came from Americans for Prosperity—a political
advocacy group funded by David and Charles Koch of Koch Industries, a $110
billion private company with major investments in the oil refining and
distribution industries.240 It argued that the Commission must “carefully
consider the rights and interests of all ratepayers” as it evaluates EV charging
programs.241
Americans for Prosperity stated it was submitting comments “in the interest
of protecting ratepayers and consumers from program designs, rules and
regulations that promote unfair and regressive forms of cross subsidization that
have been enacted in other jurisdictions.”242 It emphasized that “the Commission
is required to prevent discriminatory practices where captive electric utility
customers are forced to underwrite a distribution utility incursion into the EV
charging infrastructure market” and that “[f]airness dictates that funding of nonpublic utility service needs to be done with shareholder funds, not through
charges imposed on captive ratepayers with guaranteed cost recovery plus a
guaranteed rate of return for the utility.”243 It contended that ratepayer-funded
infrastructure is “unfair”244 because it will only “benefit the wealthiest
ratepayers” who own EVs.245 In closing, it cited the Commission’s statutory
mandate to ensure “just and reasonable” utility rates and charges and to prohibit
and declare unlawful any “unjust and unreasonable” charges. 246
The American Petroleum Institute-Illinois Petroleum Council expressed
similar sentiments, stating that “[c]onsumers and taxpayers should not be forced
to pay more in taxes, fees and/or electric utility rates so that someone else can

238

ChargePoint, Inc., Comments on Notice of Inquiry Regarding Electric Vehicles, No.
18-NOI-01, at 1-2 (Ill. Commerce Comm’n Oct. 23, 2018), https://www.icc.illinois.gov
/downloads/public/evnoi/ChargePoint.pdf [https://perma.cc/8VTD-XQKP].
239
Id. at 10-11.
240
See Koch Industries, FORBES, https://www.forbes.com/companies/koch-industries
/#732c6aa074ce [https://perma.cc/T8TP-KG5R] (last visited Feb. 18, 2020).
241
Americans for Prosperity-Illinois, Comment Letter on Notice of Inquiry Regarding
Electric Vehicles, No. 18-NOI-01, at 1 (Ill. Commerce Comm’n Oct. 23, 2018),
https://www.icc.illinois.gov/downloads/public/evnoi/Americans%20for%20Prosperity%20Il
linois-Notice%20of%20Inquiry%20Regarding%20Electric%20Vehicles%2018-NOI-01.pdf
[https://perma.cc/D4LL-LPTW].
242
Id.
243
Id. (emphasis omitted).
244
Id.
245
Id. at 3.
246
Id. (quoting Just and Reasonable Rates Charges, 220 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-101 (2019)).
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purchase and operate an expensive electric vehicle.”247 It stated that EV charging
“is currently only used by a small fraction of drivers, many of whom are wealthy
enough to afford these more expensive vehicles,” and that to allow utility
investment in EV charging infrastructure and recover costs from all ratepayers
“will result in an unfair shifting of costs onto those who have not opted for this
technology.”248
These comments show a range of views regarding the benefits of
transportation electrification and utility investment in EV charging. Most
commenters explicitly tied EV charging to energy efficiency, as the Commission
had requested in its initial Notice of Inquiry order, and provided guidance on
how EV charging could be made consistent with energy efficiency goals even
though electricity use would likely increase through EV adoption. With utilities
and environmental groups aligned, both groups could benefit from the Illinois
utilities’ expertise with Illinois customer and grid data and the environmental
groups’ experience participating in numerous similar proceedings in other states.
Whether to focus on current costs and benefits to ratepayers as opposed to
future costs and benefits remained a constant theme in these proceedings, similar
to the debate in the rooftop solar net metering context. And, once again, the party
with the most to lose from the program—here, the oil companies—hid behind
ratepayer fairness and cross subsidy arguments just as the utilities have done in
the rooftop solar arena. Finally, it is important to note that the Illinois proceeding
was a Notice of Inquiry soliciting responses to specific Commission questions,
rather than an evaluation of a concrete utility proposal for investment. This
means that the scope of inquiry was fairly broad and avoided the need to delve
too deeply into any of the data provided by proponents or opponents.
b.

Missouri

Unlike the proceeding in Illinois, the Missouri proceeding involved a specific
utility proposal for investment in EV charging infrastructure. In November
2017, Ameren Missouri filed an “efficient electrification program” tariff case
with the Missouri Public Service Commission.249 Within this case was “[a]
proposal to allow Ameren Missouri to provide incentives to encourage electric
vehicle charging stations.”250 This “Charge Ahead—Electric Vehicles” program
would “defray part or all of the cost of installing and operating electric vehicle

247

American Petroleum Institute-Illinois Petroleum Council, Comment Letter on Notice
of Inquiry Regarding Electric Vehicles, No. 18-NOI-01, at 1 (Ill. Commerce Comm’n Oct.
22, 2018) (emphasis omitted), https://www.icc.illinois.gov/downloads/public/evnoi/Revised
%20Comments%20API-IPC%20letter%20to%20ICC%20Palivos-%20EV's.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4947-M7XD].
248
Id. at 2.
249
Union Elec. Co., Notice of Case Filing, File No. ET-2018-0132, at 1 (Mo. Pub. Serv.
Comm’n Nov. 15, 2017), https://www.efis.psc.mo.gov/mpsc/commoncomponents/view
document.asp?DocId=936117687 [https://perma.cc/75LJ-GSJ7].
250
Id.
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(‘EV’) charging stations” and would include workplace, public space,
multifamily dwelling, and interstate/highway corridor chargers.251 The program
would cost $11 million.252 Ameren Missouri claimed that the program, along
with a related program to provide financial incentives for adoption of electric
forklifts and other business equipment (called the “Business Solutions
Program”) would
(a) provide benefits to both Ameren Missouri and its customers, both from
the standpoint of lower overall rates, more efficient utilization of the
electric grid, and reduced emissions in the areas where those customers
work and live; and (b) not negatively affect[] either the Company’s
customers who are not participants in the program or regulated alternative
fuel suppliers competing in the Company’s service territory. 253
Notably, in explaining why the program would benefit all utility customers,
Ameren Missouri’s written testimony relied expressly on various energy
efficiency cost-effectiveness tests, including the Ratepayer Impact Measure
(“RIM”) test.254 In its Statement of Position supporting the program, Ameren
stated that:
The Rate Impact Measure (“RIM”) test, a common cost-effectiveness test
that looks at the impact of a program on customer rates, indicates that the
cost of the program will be more than fully offset by the benefits arising
from the EVs using the program. The amount above program costs is a
contribution to recovery of the fixed costs of the electric system which
results in lower rates for all Ameren Missouri customers.255

251
Union Elec. Co., Application, File No. ET-2018-0132, at 3 (Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm’n
Feb. 22, 2018), https://www.efis.psc.mo.gov/mpsc/commoncomponents/viewdocument.asp?
DocId=936135248 [https://perma.cc/6CLZ-DAPR].
252
See Ameren Plans $11 Million Program to Add Charging Stations, ASSOCIATED PRESS
(Feb. 22, 2018), https://apnews.com/8c6391c965e343b7a61b6eb56d5ef548 [https://perma.cc
/446X-Z35U].
253
Union Elec. Co., Application, supra note 251, at 4-5.
254
Union Elec. Co., Direct Testimony of David K. Pickles on Behalf of Union Electric
Company, File No. ET-2018-0132, at 9-11 (Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm’n Feb. 22, 2018),
https://www.efis.psc.mo.gov/mpsc/commoncomponents/viewdocument.asp?DocId=936135
253 [https://perma.cc/5MXT-5EVY]; Union Elec. Co., Direct Testimony of Michael W.
Harding on Behalf of Union Electric Company, File No. ET-2018-0132, at 9-11 (Mo. Pub.
Serv. Comm’n Feb. 22, 2018), https://www.efis.psc.mo.gov/mpsc/commoncomponents
/viewdocument.asp?DocId=936135259 [https://perma.cc/2P9C-QBMV]; Union Elec. Co.,
Direct Testimony of Steven M. Wills on Behalf of Union Electric Company, File No. ET2018-0132, at 16-40 (Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm’n Feb. 22, 2018), https://www.efis.psc.mo.gov
/mpsc/commoncomponents/viewdocument.asp?DocId=936135251 [https://perma.cc/7A324MMZ].
255
Union Elec. Co., Ameren Missouri’s Statement of Position, File No. ET-2018-0132, at
2 (Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm’n Nov. 27, 2018), https://www.efis.psc.mo.gov/mpsc/common
components/viewdocument.asp?DocId=936193655 [https://perma.cc/5G2V-GQCZ].
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Thus, in its analysis, the utility expressly relied on energy efficiency costeffectiveness tests to provide an evaluation of cost-effectiveness for EV charging
programs.256
However, the Commission’s Staff recommended the rejection of the EV
program as proposed, and urged the Commission to “order modification of the
Workplace, Multifamily, and Public Area subprograms to minimize free
ridership and maximize public policy benefits.”257 Staff conceded that all
customers would in fact pay lower rates if Ameren Missouri could incentivize
sufficient EV adoption such that additional revenues would exceed the costs of
grid expansion, subsidies, and program costs.258 Nevertheless, it found that the
utility had not provided sufficient evidence that such adoption would occur.259
Indeed, Staff warned that, “as designed, these programs are rife with
opportunities for free ridership and fail to include provisions to maximize public
policy related benefits.”260 Based on the current proposal, Staff found that
Ameren Missouri has made no clear connection between this program and
its estimate of an additional 7,500 electric vehicles in the Ameren Missouri
service territory for parties to begin to determine what level of adoption is
naturally occurring and what would be attributable to the $11 million
ratepayer subsidy.261
The Office of Public Counsel262 was also critical of the proposal but ultimately
recommended approval of the program coupled with a performance-based
recovery mechanism linking Ameren Missouri’s recovery to EV adoption rates
in its service territory.263

256
For a discussion of the various tests used for determining cost-effectiveness of energy
efficiency programs, including the RIM, see supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
257
Union Elec. Co., Staff Position Statements, File No. ET-2018-0132, at 1 (Mo. Pub.
Serv. Comm’n Nov. 27, 2018), https://www.efis.psc.mo.gov/mpsc/commoncomponents
/viewdocument.asp?DocId=936193672 [https://perma.cc/69DP-UW6N].
258
Id. at 3.
259
Id.; see also Union Elec. Co., Rebuttal Testimony of Sarah L.K. Lange, Case No. ET2018-0132, at 2-13 (Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm’n Oct. 1, 2018), https://www.efis.psc.mo.gov
/mpsc/commoncomponents/viewdocument.asp?DocId=936184226 [https://perma.cc/LTS2AN5A] (criticizing Ameren cost-effectiveness analysis).
260
Union Elec. Co., Staff Position Statements, supra note 257, at 6.
261
Id. at 1-2.
262
The Missouri legislature created the Office of Public Counsel in 1975 to represent the
interests of utility customers in proceedings before the Missouri Public Service Commission.
See Who We Are, MO. OFF. PUB. COUNS., https://opc.mo.gov/who-we-are.html
[https://perma.cc/7EGX-BC62] (last visited Feb. 18, 2020).
263
Union Elec. Co., Position Statement of the Office of the Public Counsel, File No. ET2018-0132, at 1 (Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm’n Nov. 27, 2018), https://www.efis.psc.mo.gov
/mpsc/commoncomponents/viewdocument.asp?DocId=936193667 [https://perma.cc/28466836].
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Not surprisingly, the Missouri Petroleum Marketers and Convenience Store
Association (“MPCA”) opposed approval of the EV charging program. It noted
that Missouri had not adopted the ZEV Memorandum of Understanding, and
thus there was no policy in the state supporting EVs.264 More importantly, it
argued that the proposal “seeks to gamble on potential future consumer behavior,
financed by, and the risk borne, by its ratepayers.” 265
On the other side, the Sierra Club and Natural Resources Defense Council
recommended approval of the program with only minor modifications. 266 They
claimed that the utility had actually been conservative in its estimate of public
benefits of EV adoption and that it should be allowed full recovery of prudently
incurred costs.267 The environmental groups’ position focused on the claim that
the public benefits of EVs actually are quite large and are sufficient to mitigate
any cost shift.268 The Missouri Division of Energy also supported the proposal,
but it recommended that 10% of the budget be allocated to support EV charging
station development in “underserved and low-income communities” as a way to
combat cost shifting.269 ChargePoint echoed these calls for approval, claiming
that Ameren’s “program design reduces risks to ratepayers, lowers the cost
barrier to [EV charging infrastructure] deployment, allows the charging station
site host to determine which equipment and services best meet their needs, and
builds a sustainable EV charging marketplace to help accelerate EV
adoption.”270
The Missouri proceeding, which is still pending before the Commission,
showcases many of the same arguments made in the Illinois proceeding but in
the context of a concrete utility proposal for EV charging investment. 271
Although the $11 million requested for the program is significantly more modest
than other programs approved in 2018 in California, Massachusetts, and other
states, the Missouri Commission will need to act without the benefit of
264

Union Elec. Co., Brief of Amicus Curiae of Missouri Petroleum Marketers &
Convenience Store Association, File No. ET-2018-0132, at 3 (Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm’n Jan.
7, 2019), https://www.efis.psc.mo.gov/mpsc/commoncomponents/viewdocument.asp?DocId
=936199799 [https://perma.cc/3XDZ-BN3H].
265
Id. at 5 (footnote omitted).
266
Union Elec. Co., Statement of Position of Sierra Club & Natural Resources Defense
Council, File No. ET-2018-0132, at 1 (Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm’n Nov. 27, 2018),
https://www.efis.psc.mo.gov/mpsc/commoncomponents/viewdocument.asp?DocId=936193
556 [https://perma.cc/FC32-7DNK].
267
Id. at 2.
268
Id. at 3-4.
269
Union Elec. Co., Missouri Division of Energy’s Statement of Positions, File No. ET2018-0132, at 1 (Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm’n Nov. 27, 2018), https://www.efis.psc.mo.gov/mpsc
/commoncomponents/viewdocument.asp?DocId=936193636 [https://perma.cc/JA6K-7X3S].
270
Union Elec. Co., ChargePoint, Inc.’s Statement of Position on the Issues, File No. ET2018-0132, at 2 (Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm’n Nov. 27, 2018), https://www.efis.psc.mo.gov/mpsc
/commoncomponents/viewdocument.asp?DocId=936193649 [https://perma.cc/N97C-4P6L].
271
Id. at 1-2.
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legislative or executive branch direction declaring the public benefits of
transportation electrification or utility investment in EV charging. Instead, the
parties supporting the program must rely on general statutory language
regarding just and reasonable rates and fit the program within the costeffectiveness regime that exists for utility-funded energy efficiency programs,
which is potentially a helpful model for other similarly situated states.
c.

Maryland

In Maryland, in 2018, a coalition of charging companies, environmental
groups, four Maryland investor-owned utilities, and other interested parties
(referred to as the “Signatory Parties”) filed a joint “Proposal to Implement a
Statewide Electric Vehicle Portfolio” that included utility investments in EV
charging totaling over $100 million.272 Program components included rebates
for residential and commercial EV chargers; utility-owned public charging
networks; funding for customer outreach, innovation, and technological
development; and implementation of time-of-use rates to support “smart
charging.”273 Most of the rebates for private charging included dollar caps or
percentage caps on the cost of the charger. In support of the program, the
Signatory Parties cited to state policies supporting EVs and EV charging
infrastructure, including the State’s Greenhouse Gas Reduction Act, the eightstate Zero-Emission Vehicle Memorandum of Understanding, Maryland’s role
in the Transportation Climate Initiative, the legislatively created Electric
Vehicle Infrastructure Council, and the Maryland EV Recharging Equipment
Rebate Program.274
The Signatory Parties contended “that a targeted ratepayer investment
facilitated by the Utilities and made in conjunction with private market
participants will seed the burgeoning Maryland EV landscape in a manner that
will promote a healthy, competitive, and lasting private market moving
forward.”275 The Signatory Parties also discussed a range of Maryland-specific
expert cost-benefit studies to establish the cost-effectiveness of the Proposal and
explain how all utility customers will benefit from the investment. 276 They also
proposed an “evaluation, measurement, and verification” strategy similar to the
approaches used in the energy efficiency context. 277

272
PC44 Electric Vehicle Work Grp., Signatory Parties, Proposal to Implement a
Statewide Electric Vehicle Portfolio, Case No. 9478, at 27-31, 56-60 (Md. Pub. Serv.
Comm’n Jan. 19, 2018), https://webapp.psc.state.md.us/newIntranet/Casenum/NewIndex3_
VOpenFile.cfm?FilePath=//Coldfusion/Casenum/9400-9499/9478/\1.pdf [https://perma.cc
/4LFA-F3LA].
273
Id. at 27-29.
274
Id. at 3-9.
275
Id. at 9.
276
Id. at 19-20.
277
Id. at 36-39.
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Numerous participants in the regulatory proceeding raised free riding and cost
shift arguments targeted primarily at the rebates for residential and commercial
EV chargers. This part of the program most closely resembles energy efficiency
programs in that is it important to determine the extent to which utility customers
would have purchased the EV chargers even in the absence of the subsidy. In
energy efficiency parlance, those customers are free riders and their actions
should not be included as program benefits.
For instance, the Maryland Office of People’s Counsel expressed concern that
the utility programs would replace or subsidize private investment in EV
charging, resulting in excessive costs for ratepayers and stifling the private
market.278 It found deficiencies in the proposed cost-benefit analyses and
suggested that, “similar to the evaluation of energy-efficiency programs, an
evaluation of the EV Proposal could also include deriving metrics like
freeridership and net-to-gross.”279 In later comments, the Office of People’s
Counsel again stressed free riding concerns, stating that the utilities should use
the metrics and data on free riding from their own energy efficiency programs
and finding that the rebates proposed for EV chargers were at a much higher
percentage than those used in the past for water heaters and other appliances. 280
It warned that “[i]f rebates are set at a level that is higher than what is optimal,
then less customers will be able to participate in the program and free ridership
will increase.”281 Despite these criticisms, it expressed support that program
modifications, along with a full evidentiary hearing, could “bring significant
benefits to Maryland’s ratepayers” once further developed. 282
Likewise, the Maryland Energy Administration (“MEA”) found that the
proposal did not sufficiently support a determination that the investment would
lead to the increase in EVs needed to meet program goals and achieve systemwide benefits.283 While it supported the time-of-use-rate programs and pilot
programs to assess managed charging, it opposed any subsidies or other utility
278
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investments in EV charging in areas that were not publicly accessible, which
would mean eliminating most of the residential and commercial rebates for EV
chargers.284 In later comments, the Administration again warned against
allowing subsidies for private EV charging: “Meaningful portions of total
program costs . . . represent large transfers to individual households . . . . This,
in effect, means that lower-income households could be subsidizing upperincome households without receiving direct benefits, which presents a serious
issue of equity for Maryland ratepayers.”285
For its part, the Commission Staff filed comments that included free rider
concerns associating with EV charger rebates.286 It suggested limiting rebates to
EV owners who purchased EVs after the start of the program on the theory that
utility customers with EVs before the start of the program would be more likely
to purchase an EV charger even without the program subsidy. 287 Staff also urged
that the Commission reduce the subsidy amount in order to limit cross
subsidization and to forbid utilities from owning public chargers because the
private charging market could serve that role and because of rate design
challenges.288
Finally, the American Petroleum Institute argued against the program in its
entirety, warning that “[c]onsumers, ratepayers, and taxpayers should not be
forced to pay more in taxes, fees and/or electric utility rates so that someone else

284
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can purchase and operate an expensive vehicle.” 289 It contended that cost
recovery from all ratepayers “will result in an unfair shifting of costs onto those
who have not opted for this technology.”290
In 2019, the Maryland Commission issued its decision.291 It found that the
$104 million the utilities requested was “overly broad and costly to ratepayers,”
so it cut down the proposed number of chargers the utilities could install at
customer residences using ratepayer funding from 18,000 to 3000, cut the
rebates per charger from $500 to $300, and allowed utilities to build and own
850 public chargers to support growth in that market. 292
In its order, the Commission began by detailing the various legislative and
executive branch statements of support for transportation electrification,
including the status of Maryland as a ZEV state.293 It then turned to the evidence
associated with the cost-benefit assessments provided by the utilities and the
opponents of the programs.294 The Commission acknowledged that
“[d]etermining the cost-effectiveness of the EV Portfolio has been challenging,
as the record lacks detailed cost effectiveness information, and the Utilities’ own
cost assessments are superficial at best.”295 The Commission also recognized,
however, that “there are challenges with identifying an appropriate cost-benefit
test insofar as the EV industry is still nascent and evolving, and quality data
remains sparse.”296 It noted that “EV charging deployments do not fit well with
any current cost-benefit test” (with reference to the Ratepayer Impact Measure
test, Total Resource Cost test, and Societal Cost Test) and that a combination of
tests may lead to more successful results.297
The Commission noted both the “short- and long-term benefits” of expanded
EV infrastructure and EV adoption, including “enhancing grid resiliency,
improving air quality for all Maryland citizens, creating jobs, reducing costs of
personal transportation, and strengthening the resilience of transportation
networks.”298 In light of the lack of solid cost-effectiveness evidence, however,
289
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the Commission held it could not justify approving the entire $104 million
investment at the present time, opting instead for a scaled-down pilot project for
residential chargers with the lower rebate cap and more limited utility
investments in public charging.299 Notably, the Commission approved utility
investments and incentives in EV charging in multiunit dwellings and other
underserved areas.300 The Commission found that such investments were in the
public interest and “afford[ed] the Utilities the opportunity to test whether these
incentives can encourage a broader range of communities to purchase electric
vehicles.”301
Maryland provides an example of a state commission proceeding regarding
utility investment in EV charging where the Commission and many of the parties
used arguments regarding cost-effectiveness tests and concerns over free riders
to help develop an appropriate utility EV charging program rather than oppose
the investment completely. Moreover, the Commission order is similar to the
Nevada Commission’s net metering decision discussed earlier. In both cases, the
Commission authorized a program that had the potential to provide significant
but uncertain future benefits to the public even though evidence of present-day
cost-effectiveness was limited at best.
II.

MOVING BEYOND FREE RIDING AND CROSS SUBSIDY ARGUMENTS IN
ENERGY POLICY: LESSONS FROM THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE

This Part builds on the previous discussion and suggests approaches for
regulators in evaluating free riding and cross subsidy arguments in electric utility
“energy transition” proceedings such as removing barriers to distributed solar or
encouraging transportation electrification. In doing so, it proposes a long-term
view of both costs and benefits for new programs that invokes the precautionary
principle. More specifically, in the context of distributed solar and EV charging
policies, it suggests that regulators adopt principles developed in the energy
efficiency context and modify them for current program development. Such an
approach has the potential to reduce barriers to contemporary energy transition
efforts and to address many of the fairness and cross subsidy concerns raised in
utility regulatory proceedings.
As discussed in Part I, regulators have decades of experience evaluating
utility-funded energy efficiency programs, as well as the system-wide benefits
of those programs on a long-term basis. The metrics are far from perfect, as
evidenced by continuing debates over the role of energy efficiency programs in

299
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reducing energy use.302 Nevertheless, there is at least a general consensus that
energy efficiency can have significant present benefits and future benefits to all
utility customers even if the full extent of free riders, spillovers, and other factors
remains in dispute. The same cannot be said for the long-term benefits of
distributed solar and EV charging. From a regulatory perspective, these
programs are in their infancy. As a result, state public utility commissions are
reviewing dockets—sometimes with and sometimes without the benefit of
specific legislative direction—and making decisions that will impact
technological developments, utility experience, and utility customer choices.
In many ways, there are important parallels between these current regulatory
challenges and the longstanding debates pitting cost-benefit analysis against the
precautionary principle in developing environmental, health, and safety
regulations. Cost-benefit analysis “is a well-established, if fallible, methodology
for ensuring that regulations enhance, rather than detract from, overall social
welfare.”303 It does so by attempting to prevent inefficient regulations by
comparing the costs and benefits of a particular regulatory action. 304 Many
scholars criticize cost-benefit analysis as being inherently imprecise and
subjective.305 Indeed, it is very difficult to place a monetary value on many of
the benefits of environmental, health, and safety regulations—such as clean air,
clean water, human life and health, scenic and aesthetic values, and plant and
animal health.306
Environmental law scholars have long pointed to the precautionary principle
as a potential alternative approach.307 The precautionary principle calls for a
higher level of regulation—or precaution—when significant but uncertain risks
exist, such as harm from climate change or toxic chemicals.308 One articulation
302
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of the precautionary principle from the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment
and Development states that “[w]hen there are threats of serious or irreversible
damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for
postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.” 309
Thus, the precautionary principle generally places the burden of proof on those
who would limit regulation with the potential to enhance public welfare—
particularly environmental health and safety—in the face of uncertainty. By
contrast, cost-benefit analysis places the burden of proof on proponents of
regulation; if benefits of regulation or risks of harm in the absence of regulation
are uncertain or difficult to value, regulation is likely to be deemed inefficient
under a cost-benefit test.
The literature supporting and criticizing cost-benefit analysis and the ability
to manipulate its inputs is extensive and beyond the scope of this Article. So too
are the scholarly and regulatory debates on the role of the precautionary
principle, both as an alternative to cost-benefit analysis and as a principle to
integrate into cost-benefit analysis.310 Similar concerns, however, come up
repeatedly in the regulatory proceedings over how to value the costs and benefits
of distributed-solar compensation and EV charging investments. Questions arise
over how to weigh current and future costs to non-solar customers and non-EV
drivers against system-wide benefits that may not accrue to all utility customers
until far into the future, if at all.311 Should the precautionary principle be applied
to these regulatory analyses to reduce barriers to distributed solar and
transportation electrification? Or should a narrower form of cost-benefit analysis
be applied? Does the precautionary principle justify borrowing one of the
broader cost-effectiveness tests from the energy efficiency context, like the
Societal Cost Test, in evaluating these programs or should regulators use a more
conservative test, like the Ratepayer Impact Measure?312 The remainder of this
Part provides an evaluation of these issues.

uncertainty and ignorance, as opposed to the conditions of probabilistic sophistication that are
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Addressing Uncertainty in Evaluating Costs and Benefits of Distributed
Solar

The regulatory proceedings in Arizona and Nevada illustrate state regulatory
commissions struggling to deal with uncertainties over how to monetize,
calculate, and weigh future costs and benefits associated with creating incentives
for rooftop solar through net metering policies. Both commissions were faced
with a similar problem, namely the absence of reliable data regarding the costs
and benefits of a utility subsidy program—net metering—that may provide more
obvious benefits for one group of customers now but may provide overall
benefits to all customers both now and in the future, including reduced electricity
bills and improved public welfare through reduced GHG emissions and other air
pollutants. In both cases, the utility raised free riding, fairness, and cross subsidy
arguments and, because of its role in managing the grid and customers, was at
an information advantage compared to solar proponents. One commission,
Arizona, was receptive to the utility’s arguments regarding fairness313 while the
other commission, Nevada, looked beyond those arguments to the bigger picture
of the overall benefits that rooftop solar could provide to the entire utility system
and the state.314
In the Arizona proceeding, the Commission found a lack of measurable
objective and subjective values that distributed solar provided to the utility
system.315 In the absence of hard data showing those values were equitably
distributed across all customers, the Commission decided to place at least some
additional charges on solar customers. 316 Even though the fixed charges the
Commission imposed were far less than those requested by the utility, the order
assumed there was at least some cross subsidy that must be addressed to ensure
just and reasonable rates.317
By contrast, in Nevada, the Commission focused on whether there was an
“unreasonable” cost shift between customer classes rather than any cost shift at
all based on the applicable statute.318 In finding no unreasonable cost shift, the
Commission recognized that the evidence was in conflict, that present costs and
benefits and future costs and benefits could not be measured accurately, and that
“[j]umping to a premature conclusion for the mere sake of having a resolution
while the conversation and technology is evolving would not serve the public
interest and Nevada.”319 The Commission was concerned that a wrong answer
was worse than an uncertain answer, particularly when the benefits associated
with distributed solar were real but “hard to quantify.” 320 This analysis has many
313
314
315
316
317
318
319
320
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hallmarks of the precautionary principle, even if the Commission did not use
that term. In the face of uncertainty, it chose a policy that would potentially
provide environmental and system-wide economic benefits to all utility
customers in the future as well as public benefits to the entire state even if there
may be some shifting of costs to certain utility customers in the short term.
Moreover, although neither commission expressly referred to the costeffectiveness tests from the energy efficiency realm, the debate over whether to
use a narrow test looking at current, distributional fairness or a broader test that
considers future, societal impacts could be seen just barely below the surface of
the proceedings. Both commissions recognized they were working with
incomplete information on costs, benefits, and distributional implications of the
policies under consideration. The Arizona Commission appeared to apply a
more traditional cost-benefit analysis that heavily weighed the inputs the utility
provided while the Nevada Commission took a different approach that more
resembled application of the precautionary principle. Both commissions
recognized that their results were crude at best and would need to be modified
in the future.321
Most experts in the field recognize that solar net metering is a fairly rough
approach to compensating a growing energy resource across the country,
particularly when the costs of net metering on a kWh basis far exceed those of
utility-scale solar and other utility-scale renewable energy resources in
wholesale markets.322 By the same token, paying distributed-solar customers a
rate that is based on wholesale prices for utility-scale wind and solar energy may
also not be appropriate as such pricing may fail to compensate distributed-solar
customers for the value of distributed energy, which, if widely adopted, may
lead to new markets, technology and investment in microgrids, battery storage,
and the like.
In considering new approaches, however, public utility commissions should
be cautious of free riding arguments articulated by utilities in a regulatory forum
that cannot fully value the present costs and benefits and future costs and
benefits of distributed solar energy on the electric grid.323 More states are
beginning to enact legislation and regulations to replace net metering similar to
Minnesota’s to avoid the net metering disputes on display in the Arizona and
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Nevada proceedings.324 Scholars have also suggested an “avoided cost plus
social benefit” approach that resembles some of the broader energy efficiency
tests discussed in Section I.A by expressly valuing social benefits of distributed
solar.325 These approaches begin to not only reduce regulatory barriers to
distributed solar but also address legitimate fairness and cross subsidy concerns
by helping design pricing programs that more appropriately compensate rooftop
solar owners based on present costs and benefits and future costs and benefits.
In the interim, there is value in recognizing that in most areas of the country,
penetration levels of distributed solar energy are still extremely low. Regulators
have time to develop metrics to evaluate the costs and benefits of distributed
solar now and worry about the effects of larger penetration and ultimate rate
design later, when more is known about the scale at which solar penetration will
have a measurable positive or negative impact on rates, utility costs, and other
factors. Using a precautionary approach will allow regulators to place the burden
on utilities and others to show that rooftop solar is currently a problem for system
maintenance or that cross subsidies are significant. To merely assume that
rooftop solar presents system-maintenance problems and unfair cross subsidies
risks stifling expansion of an important energy resource with the potential for
significant public benefits. This is particularly true because improved metrics
will be developed within a regulatory system where cross subsidies have always
existed and will continue to exist, often without objection by participants and
regulators. To single out one type of cross subsidy without recognizing the
context in which it exists is short sighted.326
B.

Using Energy Efficiency Metrics to Develop Frameworks for Utility
Investment in EV Charging

In the EV charging context, proponents are approaching state regulatory
commissions with increasingly sophisticated analyses of future program
benefits, and this time it is the opponents of such programs who are at a relative
information disadvantage. This is because in the EV charging context, utilities
are mostly aligned with private charging companies and environmental
nonprofit groups, reducing some of the information asymmetries on display in
324
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the rooftop solar context. However, there is still an information deficit because
there are many unknowns regarding the extent of climate change damage
associated with continuing to drive conventional vehicles; the pace of EV
adoption; and the impact of EVs, both positive and negative, on the electric grid.
This information will not exist until electric utilities, drivers, car companies, and
others can evaluate the impacts of broad-based transportation electrification.
Nevertheless, state regulatory commissions are responding to utility proposals
for EV charging investments, and participants in these proceedings are making
much more explicit use of energy efficiency cost-effectiveness tests than they
are in the distributed-solar context. This is in part because the parallels between
utility investment in energy efficiency programs and utility investment in EV
charging are much more obvious, at least in the context of utility rebates for EV
chargers, which are a component of many utility proposals. In the energy
efficiency context, a major goal of regulatory design is to identify free riders—
utility customers who would have purchased a new furnace, energy efficient
lighting, new insulation, or the like even in the absence of the utility subsidy. In
the same way, a utility program to incentivize the purchase of EV chargers is
not cost-effective if significant ratepayer funds are being used to subsidize
customer purchases of EV chargers that would have occurred even absent the
subsidy program.327
For instance, in the Illinois Notice of Inquiry proceeding described above, the
Commission specifically asked participants to discuss how EVs would
contribute to energy efficiency in Illinois through fuel switching and how EV
charging stations would affect utility energy efficiency programs. 328 Because the
Illinois Commission was not considering a specific utility proposal, the
participants did not evaluate any cost-effectiveness tests but instead provided
general information on how EVs and EV charging would impact utility energy
efficiency programs in the state.329
In Missouri, by contrast, there was significant testimony regarding whether
the utility’s EV charging proposal would meet the Ratepayer Impact Measure
Test, with Ameren contending that it would meet the test as well as provide
environmental benefits.330 In response, Commission Staff recommended
rejection of the EV program because there was inadequate evidence that the
program would result in sufficient EV adoption to increase utility revenues
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enough to cover the costs of the grid expansion, subsidies, and program costs. 331
Moreover, Commission Staff found that Ameren Missouri did not provide
sufficient evidence that the subsidy proposed for EV chargers would avoid
significant free riding.332 Comments from the Office of Public Counsel were
similar, arguing that the utility had failed to meet its burden of showing the
program was cost-effective.333
Notably, in their comments, opponents of Ameren’s proposal used energy
efficiency metrics to oppose the program in its entirety rather than to urge
revisions to the program, as would be the case in the energy efficiency
context.334 This is not surprising. There is no legislation in Missouri that
promotes EVs or EV charging, in contrast to utility-funded energy efficiency
programs that are creatures of state statute.335 As a result, free riding arguments
in non-ZEV states can easily be used in a pejorative way similar to their use by
electric utilities in the rooftop solar context.
This stands in contrast to Maryland, where free riding arguments by parties
were primarily used to attempt to modify the program and to encourage the
development of metrics to ensure cost-effectiveness, more similar to the use of
free riding in the energy efficiency context.336 The Maryland Commission order
also followed this approach. It recognized the present-day uncertainty of
program benefits but allowed pilot projects to proceed.337 It based this decision
on the importance of transportation electrification in general and confidence that
the pilot would lead to better data to support program development. 338 It also
ensured that significant program dollars would go towards encouraging EV
adoption among customers living in multifamily dwellings and in underserved
areas.339 In this way the Maryland proceedings are an example of a productive
use of free riding arguments and an application of the precautionary principle.
In particular, the emphasis by all parties on the need for infrastructure
investment in low-income communities and multifamily housing shows how
cross subsidy and fairness concerns can be addressed through program
development.340
Finally, the state EV charging proceedings illustrate how developing better
metrics for transportation electrification programs can address legitimate
fairness and cross subsidy concerns raised by ratepayer advocacy groups like the
Office of Public Counsel in Missouri and Office of People’s Counsel in
331
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Maryland.341 These ratepayer advocacy groups have an important mission to
advocate on behalf of state utility customers—particularly residential, small
business, and low-income customers—to ensure rates are not excessive and that
particular classes of customers are not unduly burdened by rate increases. 342 As
a result, their concerns should be given far more weight than similar arguments
made by oil companies and their trade associations. But such arguments should
not focus narrowly on the current costs and benefits of new regulatory policies
just because future benefits are difficult to value. A precautionary approach
designed to develop improved metrics for evaluating present costs and benefits
and future costs and benefits of EV charging investments can integrate these
concerns into a broader analysis that includes both cost-effectiveness metrics
and a calculation of broader benefits associated with transportation
electrification.
CONCLUSION
There is an important role for free riding, fairness, and cross subsidy concerns
in both the distributed solar and EV charging regulatory proceedings, just as
there has been for decades in the energy-efficiency realm. But it is clear that
opponents of regulatory programs to incentivize distributed solar and EV
adoption have used and will continue to use free riding, fairness, and cross
subsidy arguments to block programs that may hurt them financially.
Commissions should look beyond these arguments and consider free riding,
fairness, and cross subsidy concerns for purposes of requiring program
advocates to develop appropriate metrics to optimize the programs at issue,
rather than to impede such programs before they can provide system-wide
benefits. In order to do so, state utility commissions can apply a precautionary
approach with regard to evaluating present costs and benefits and future costs
and benefits. They can also urge participants in regulatory proceedings to look
to existing energy efficiency metrics as a starting point for analysis and to
modify these metrics to meet the needs of developing programs and the public.
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The same can be said for state Attorney General offices and, in many cases, state public
utility commission staff that must consider the distributional impacts of electricity rate
increases in their evaluation of net metering, EV charging, energy efficiency, or other state
policy developments.
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